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INTRODUCTION
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,1 the
Supreme Court’s decision upholding the landmark Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (ACA or “Obamacare”),2 sets forth the most
important judicial examination of constitutional power since the New
Deal era. The political and media frenzy over the Obamacare case has
obscured its actual legal analysis and larger constitutional implications,
which warrant more reflective study. This Article seeks to provide such
a scholarly perspective.
My starting point is the ACA, which has three key provisions. First,
it requires “guaranteed issue” of health insurance to all applicants and
“community rating” to prevent insurance companies from varying the
price of policies to account for individual characteristics such as preexisting medical conditions.3 Second, the ACA imposes an “Individual
Mandate” (IM): Uninsured Americans “shall” obtain “minimum
essential coverage” and, if they fail to meet this “individual
responsibility requirement,” must pay a “penalty” to the Internal
Revenue Service.4 Third, Obamacare dramatically expands Medicaid to
millions of new recipients by requiring states to either provide health
care to all of their low-income citizens or lose their current federal
Medicaid funding.5
The Court splintered in determining whether Congress could validly
enact the ACA as an exercise of its Article I powers to “regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States,” to “make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution [its delegated]
Powers,” to “lay and collect Taxes,” and to spend “for the . . . general
Welfare.”6 Only Chief Justice John Roberts was in the majority on each
of the Court’s holdings.
Initially, he and his four fellow Republicans (Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito) concluded that the IM could not be
sustained under the Commerce Clause, which authorized Congress to
1. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
2. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) [hereinafter ACA], amended by Health
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029.
3. See ACA, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1) (2012); Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2585.
4. ACA, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A. The IM targets millions of younger and healthier people
who otherwise would not buy insurance unless they became seriously ill or injured, at which
point they would be assured coverage—a scenario that would result in massive cost shifting to
those who had always kept up their policies. See ACA, 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(F) (congressional
findings).
5. ACA, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (extending coverage to all citizens whose
income falls below 133% of the federal poverty line); id. § 1396c (allowing the executive to
withhold all Medicaid payments to a state not in compliance), invalidated by Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S.
Ct. 2566.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3, 18.
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regulate existing interstate commercial activity—not to compel
Americans who were not engaged in such activity to buy an unwanted
product.7 Furthermore, the majority would not permit Congress to
circumvent that restriction by relying upon the Necessary and Proper
Clause because the IM was not a “proper” means of effectuating the
Commerce Clause, since the mandate undercut the Constitution’s
structure (particularly the core principle that the federal government is
limited to its enumerated powers).8
Surprisingly, the Chief Justice then agreed with the four liberal
Justices (Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) that the IM could
reasonably be interpreted as a “tax” on those who decide to forego
health insurance.9 This statutory construction enabled the Court to
salvage the IM as a valid exercise of the Taxing Power.10
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts joined with the four conservatives, as
well as Justices Breyer and Kagan, to hold that Congress had exceeded
its power under the Spending Clause by coercing the States to comply
with the Medicaid expansion, because they could not realistically
choose to forfeit all of their existing Medicaid funding.11 Nonetheless,
Chief Justice Roberts sided with the four liberals in allowing Congress
to offer the states a fresh supply of money to encourage them to
voluntarily abide by the new ACA conditions.12
National Federation could have major ramifications for
constitutional law.13 Most notably, the Court has spawned confusion
about the Federalism Principle: that the Constitution reserves all powers
to the States or the People, except for certain enumerated powers

7. Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2585–93 (Roberts, C.J.); accord id. at 2643–50 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
8. Id. at 2592–93 (Roberts, C.J.); accord id. at 2646 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito, JJ., dissenting).
9. Id. at 2593–601 (Roberts, C.J.); accord id. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
10. Id. at 2593–601 (Roberts, C.J.); accord id. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). The Court followed the taxation analysis that had previously been laid out in
Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects Theory of the Tax
Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195 (2012).
11. Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2601–08 (Roberts, C.J.); accord id. at 2656–67 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
12. Id. at 2607–08 (Roberts, C.J.); accord id. at 2630–31, 2641–42 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). But see id. at 2656–68 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that (1) the Medicaid expansion and the IM were so integral to
the ACA that the entire statute should have been struck down, and (2) the Court was rewriting
the law by giving states the option to follow the ACA if Congress provided new funds).
13. National Federation will have “repercussions for legal doctrines and for the actual
scope of governmental powers for years to come.” Martha Minow, Affordable Convergence:
“Reasonable Interpretation” and the Affordable Care Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. 117, 119 (2012).
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entrusted to the United States Government.14 On the one hand, Chief
Justice Roberts and the four dissenters began their opinions with
eloquent summaries of the Federalism Principle15 and repeatedly
emphasized it to justify curbing Congress’s power under the Commerce,
Necessary and Proper, and Spending Clauses.16 On the other hand, the
Chief Justice abandoned federalism by allowing Congress to achieve its
desired goal under the Taxing Power,17 which has not been subjected to
any meaningful restrictions since 1937.18 This result was especially
puzzling because Congress explicitly declared that the IM was not a
“tax,” but rather was a “penalty” for violating the new legal
requirement—enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause—to purchase
health insurance.19 The majority’s creative interpretation of the ACA as
a “tax” neutered the only restraint on the Taxing Power: the political
reality that voters will not tolerate taxes above a certain level.20
National Federation may also have a profound effect on the
reputation of Chief Justice Roberts and the Court. Apparently, he was
prepared to strike down the ACA for two months after the March oral
arguments until he switched his vote in May,21 despite bitter objections
14. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 313 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and
defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite.”);
THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 199 (Alexander Hamilton) (similar). The Tenth Amendment made
this principle explicit: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
15. Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2577–80 (Roberts, C.J.); accord id. at 2642–44 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
16. Id. at 2589, 2602 (Roberts, C.J.); accord id. at 2646–47, 2659–60 (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). The Court adopted the interpretation of these Clauses that
had been set forth by Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health
Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581 (2010) [hereinafter
Barnett, Commandeering]. This article summarized the arguments about Congress’s lack of
constitutional power to impose the IM that Barnett had developed in numerous short pieces
beginning in 2009. He also spearheaded the litigation challenging the ACA. See Randy E.
Barnett, No Small Feat: Who Won the Health Care Case (and Why Did So Many Law
Professors Miss the Boat)?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1331 (2013) [hereinafter Barnett, No Small Feat]
(describing his experience in attacking the ACA as a scholar and lawyer).
17. See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also Richard A. Epstein, A Most
Improbable 1787 Constitution: A (Mostly) Originalist Critique of the Constitutionality of the
ACA, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 28,
39 (Nathaniel Persily, Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison eds., 2013) (deeming
“ludicrous” Roberts’s conclusion that Congress cannot regulate inactivity under the Commerce
Clause, but can do an end-run around this prohibition by resorting to the Taxing Clause).
18. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
19. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2650–55 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.,
dissenting) (establishing this point through a detailed examination of the ACA’s provisions and
legislative history).
20. See id. at 2655.
21. A veteran Court reporter first broke this story. See Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched
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from his Republican colleagues.22 Why did Roberts do it?
Some commentators have charged that he caved in to public pressure
from the Obama Administration and its supporters in Congress and the
media.23 Others have asserted that the Chief Justice sought to preserve
the Court’s image as an institution governed by law rather than politics,
as the public would perceive that the outcome was contrary to his
political views and showed appropriate judicial deference to the elected
branches (and to voters, who could decide the fate of Obamacare in the
upcoming election).24 Finally, many prominent scholars, both
Views to Uphold Health Care Law, CBSNEWS (July 1, 2012, 1:29 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57464549/roberts-switched-views-to-uphold-healthcare-law/.
22. Their hostility is evident not merely from their opinion’s tone but also from its odd
form and language. Initially, they departed from the longstanding practice of having one Justice
author a dissent which is joined by the others, and instead began their opinion with a unique
caption: “Justice SCALIA, Justice KENNEDY, Justice THOMAS, and Justice ALITO,
dissenting.” Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2642. Moreover, they labeled their opinion a “dissent”
and refused to join any portion of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, even though they actually
concurred with him on every major issue except the Taxing Power—and thus essentially
repeated most of his analysis. See Crawford, supra note 21. Finally, the joint dissent reads like a
majority opinion (and indeed frequently refers to Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence as a “dissent”),
with caustic criticism of the Chief Justice seemingly inserted into their original draft after he had
changed his mind. See John C. Eastman, Hidden Gems in the Historical 2011–2012 Term, and
Beyond, 7 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1, 17–19 (2012) (detailing the many linguistic clues in the joint
dissenters’ opinion which suggest that they originally had Roberts’s full support and then
refused to alter their language after he jumped ship).
23. See, e.g., Eastman, supra note 22, at 16–22; Crawford, supra note 21. Indeed, many
Republicans “exhibited a level of rage against the Chief Justice for betraying the [conservative]
agenda.” Pamela S. Karlan, Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (2012).
24. See, e.g., Noah Feldman, John Roberts, A Conservative Liberals Can Love,
BLOOMBERG (July 2, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-02/liberals-should-beglad-john-roberts-is-so-conservative.html (claiming that Roberts showed he was a “true
practitioner of judicial restraint”); Stephen B. Presser, Liberty Lost? The Supreme Court Punts,
CNN (June 28, 2012, 3:51 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/28/opinion/presser-supremecourt/ (arguing that Roberts did not want to plunge the Court back into the “political thicket” it
had entered in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), but instead entrusted the ACA to voters in the
upcoming election); David Cole, Obamacare Upheld, THE NATION (June 28, 2012) (maintaining
that Roberts sought to repair the Court’s standing as an apolitical body).
One scholar has described the Chief Justice’s opinion as “a consummate act of institutional
diplomacy . . . [that] avoided the unpalatable result of having the Court invalidate President
Obama’s signature achievement in the midst of a close reelection campaign by a 5–4 vote that
would have mapped the Justices’ ideological leanings.” Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend,
To Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83, 84 (2012). Professor Metzger characterizes the opinion as a
compromise that reconciles two competing institutional imperatives: protecting the Court’s
reputation as impartial and deferential to the elected branches on policy issues, while
reaffirming the Court’s supremacy in constitutional interpretation (which inevitably has political
overtones). Id. at 84–103, 112–13. Nonetheless, she identifies a consistent theme in Roberts’s
opinion: a libertarian resistance to government compulsion in favor of indirect, flexible, and
incentive-based regulations. Id. at 85–87, 104–13. For example, Congress could not deploy the
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conservative and liberal, have suggested that the Machiavellian Roberts
shrewdly gave liberal Democrats an immediate victory, but advanced
long-term conservative Republican interests by curtailing Congress’s
power under the Commerce, Necessary and Proper, and Spending
Clauses25—and by insulating himself from charges of partisanship when
he later casts conservative votes on issues like affirmative action and
same-sex marriage.26
The very fact that such charges of political manipulation can
plausibly be leveled damages Chief Justice Roberts’s credibility and
that of the Court.27 To be clear, I am not impugning John Roberts’s
integrity, even though I disagree with his opinion on the Taxing Clause.
The true reason for Roberts’s switch might simply be that he is a skilled
Commerce Clause to compel individuals to buy health insurance, but could use the Taxing
Power to give them a choice to purchase such insurance or pay a small tax. Id. at 86, 104–05,
107–08, 111. Similarly, under the Spending Clause, Congress could not coerce states to accept
the Medicaid expansion, but could give them monetary inducements to do so. Id. at 86, 100,
105, 108, 111.
25. Most significantly, the intellectual architect of the ACA challenge has drawn this
conclusion. See Barnett, No Small Feat, supra note 16, at 1333–35, 1343–49 (lamenting that
conservatives did not prevail in the case, but asserting that they succeeded in their larger goal of
saving the Constitution by persuading the Court to reaffirm the fundamental principle of limited
and enumerated federal powers that are judicially enforceable).
On the other side of the ideological spectrum, liberal luminary Laurence Tribe praised the
Chief Justice for upholding the IM as a tax and thereby restoring Americans’ confidence in the
Court as an apolitical legal body, but worried that Roberts’s “incorrect” constructions of the
Commerce, Necessary and Proper, and Spending Clauses might have destructive doctrinal
effects in future cases if the Republicans retained their majority. Laurence Tribe, Chief Justice
John Roberts’s Ruling Restores Faith in the Court’s Neutrality, DAILY BEAST (June 28, 2012,
2:39 PM), http://www.dailybeast.com/articles/2012/06/28/chief-justice-john-roberts-rulingrestores-faith-in-the-court-s-neutrality.html; see also Karlan, supra note 23, at 11, 27–69
(portraying National Federation as one element of the conservative Justices’ broader effort to
reverse or limit key Warren Court cases upholding Great Society and civil rights legislation and
to disable the federal government from addressing crucial national problems in innovative ways
through the political process).
In short, the theme that conservatives “lost the battle over the individual mandate but won
the constitutional war” cuts across party lines. See Metzger, supra note 24, at 87 (citing a
politically diverse group of scholars).
26. See Ronald Dworkin, Why Did Roberts Change His Mind?, NYRBLOG (July 9, 2012,
2:05 PM), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/jul/09/why-did-roberts-change-hismind/ (“Roberts may want to blunt the anticipated accusations of political partisanship that any
right-wing decisions in these [upcoming] cases will likely attract . . . .”); Gregory P. Magarian,
Chief Justice Roberts=s Individual Mandate: The Lawless Medicine of NFIB v. Sebelius, 108
NW. U. L. REV. 15, 33 (2013) (similar).
27. See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius: Five Takes, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 807, 818–23 (2013) (contending
that revelations about Roberts changing his vote in response to partisan political and media
attacks, combined with his unconvincing legal opinion, failed to legitimate the ACA=s
constitutionality and raised questions about the Court=s integrity).
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appellate lawyer.28 At the High Court level, such attorneys seek to
cobble together at least five votes, typically by crafting a centrist
position that often relies on extremely technical legal analysis and fine
distinctions.29 The pragmatic goal is to win the particular case,30 even
by making inconsistent or hairsplitting arguments—or perhaps
convincing oneself that they are actually logical and meaningful.31 The
Chief Justice’s needle-threading opinion bears the hallmarks of a
consummate appellate advocate.
It is not necessarily bad to have such a master legal technician
cautiously crafting compromise opinions.32 Nonetheless, great Chief
Justices like John Marshall and Earl Warren had a broad and coherent
constitutional vision, which they reinforced in each individual
decision.33 Instead of hitting such home runs, the Roberts Court is
playing small ball. Given the ideological divisions on the Court, this
trend will likely continue until a Democratic appointee is replaced by a
Republican one, or vice versa.34
28. Kurt Lash and Alan Untereiner urged me to consider this explanation as the most
plausible one. John Roberts won a majority of the many cases he argued before the Supreme
Court as Deputy Solicitor General from 1988–1992 and as head of Hogan & Hartson’s appellate
department from 1992–2002. See John G. Roberts Jr., THE OYEZ PROJECT AT ITT CHI.-KENT C.
L. (May 19, 2013), http://www.oyez.org/justices/john_g_roberts_jr.
29. See, e.g., CAROLE C. BERRY, EFFECTIVE APPELLATE ADVOCACY 53–56 (3d ed. 2003).
30. See MYRON MOSKOVITZ, WINNING AN APPEAL 2 (3d ed. 1995).
31. See id.; see also FREDERICK BERNAYS WEINER, EFFECTIVE APPELLATE ADVOCACY 234
(rev. ed. 1950) (“[T]he really outstanding advocate . . . [possesses] an inner conviction of the
soundness and correctness of his case. . . . This inner conviction is often self-induced, frequently
by an involved process of rationalization, but it is none the worse for that.”).
32. Martha Minow has maintained that Chief Justice Roberts did not merely broker a
result-oriented political compromise, but rather set forth an independent legal analysis that
thoughtfully engaged the arguments of the two opposed groups of Justices. See Minow, supra
note 13, at 118–21, 132–49. On the one hand, he embraced the joint dissent’s idea that the
Constitution aimed to preserve liberty, especially by establishing a limited federal government.
Id. at 132–38, 140–45, 147. On the other hand, he took to heart Justice Ginsburg’s concern that
a restrained judiciary should be appropriately deferential to the politically accountable branches
and allow them to operate efficiently. Id. at 132–35, 138–40, 143–45, 147. Moreover, Dean
Minow defended Roberts’s reported vote switch by pointing out that “[a] change in one’s views
while considering arguments in a pending case is at least as likely to indicate being open to
reason as being vulnerab[le] to political considerations.” Id. at 120 n.19.
33. See generally HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF JOHN MARSHALL,
1801–1835 (1997) (detailing the Marshall Court’s decisions); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN
COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000) (providing an in-depth history of the Warren Court).
34. Over the past generation, a high percentage of major constitutional cases, involving
both the scope of federal power and individual rights (e.g., abortion and affirmative action),
have been decided by five-to-four votes that tracked the Justices’ political party affiliation.
Admittedly, these results were not necessarily binary, as a swing Justice or two (like O’Connnor
or Kennedy) often wrote a compromise concurring opinion. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., PartialBirth Abortion and the Perils of Constitutional Common Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 519,
520–29, 578–91 (2008). Justice Alito’s replacement of Justice O’Connor had apparently left
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The foregoing themes will be developed in three parts. Part I will
critically examine the doctrinal changes wrought by National
Federation. Part II will look more broadly at the jurisprudential
implications of the decision, particularly the treatment of federalism.
Part III will consider the impact of the Obamacare case on the Court as
an institution.
I. A DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL FEDERATION
National Federation breaks new ground as to the scope of
Congress’s powers under the Commerce, Necessary and Proper, Taxing,
and Spending Clauses. I will examine each of these powers, and the
Justices’ opinions about them, in turn.
A. The Commerce Clause
The Court’s conservative and liberal blocs interpreted and applied
the same Commerce Clause cases in quite different ways. Summarizing
this precedent helps to illuminate why it is susceptible to such divergent
readings.
1. The Leading Cases
In his seminal opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden,35 Chief Justice Marshall
construed Congress’s power “to regulate Commerce . . . among the
several States” generously, in two ways. First, he defined “commerce”
as not merely “trade” (buying and selling goods), but all “commercial
intercourse”—including compensated services, such as the ferry
transportation at issue.36 Second, “among the several States”
encompassed not only commerce that crossed state lines, but also that
which took place internally but affected at least one other state.37
Justice Kennedy as the lone remaining moderate, which made it surprising that Chief Justice
Roberts (previously a staunch member of the Court’s right wing) penned the controlling opinion
in National Federation.
Moreover, I recognize that there are other isolated cases in which a Justice voted against his
or her political or ideological preference. Nonetheless, the general trend is that the Court’s
political divisions have hardened.
35. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
36. The New York Legislature had granted Ogden the exclusive right to operate ferries
traveling from that state to New Jersey, and Gibbons later threatened that monopoly by
beginning ferry service under a license granted pursuant to a 1793 federal law regulating
“vessels . . . in the coasting trade.” Id. at 1–2. Ogden claimed that Congress lacked power to
enact this statute because “commerce” referred only to the sale of goods, but the Court found
that this word encompassed other forms of commercial interaction like navigation. See id. at
188–92; see also id. at 229–30 (Johnson, J., concurring) (listing other types of “commerce,”
such as paid labor and other services, commercial paper and similar documents of exchange, and
communications).
37. Id. at 195, 203.
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For the next six decades, the Court had no occasion to consider
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause because the scope of
federal legislation remained so modest. In the late nineteenth century,
however, Congress started to regulate more extensively by tackling such
critical subjects as monopolies and railroads, and the Court responded
by establishing certain limits.38 Most importantly, the Court declared
that “commerce” included only transportation and the sale of goods (not
their prior production through manufacturing, farming, mining, or other
types of labor) and interpreted the Tenth Amendment as prohibiting
Congress from regulating activities that were “local,” even if they
indirectly affected interstate commerce.39
This jurisprudence initially led a majority of Justices to invalidate
the New Deal laws that had been passed by Congress, at President
Franklin Roosevelt’s urging, to address the severe agricultural,
industrial, and labor problems caused by the Depression.40 When voters
resoundingly reelected Roosevelt and his congressional supporters in
1936, however, the Court capitulated.41 It held in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.42 that Congress could reach even noncommercial
and intrastate activities (such as labor relations) if doing so was
“[n]ecessary and [p]roper” to effectuate the regulation of
“commerce . . . among the several States.”43 In doctrinal terms, anything
that “substantially affected” interstate commerce now fell within the
purview of the federal government.44
Shortly thereafter, Wickard v. Filburn45 vastly expanded Congress’s
power. The Court upheld a provision of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act as applied to Filburn, a small farmer who had grown more wheat
than permitted under his federal quota and had consumed the excess at
home.46 The Court deemed it irrelevant that Filburn had not been
involved in “commerce” (selling wheat) and that neither he nor his
wheat had traveled interstate.47 Similarly immaterial was Filburn’s
38. See Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause:
Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State
Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 67–79 (1999) (examining the pertinent statutes
and cases).
39. See id. at 68–70, 78 (describing the main decisions).
40. See id. at 70–71, 73–74, 78–79 (citing cases).
41. See id. at 79.
42. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
43. See id. at 34–40.
44. See id. at 36–40; see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113, 117–19 (1941)
(sustaining the Fair Labor Standards Act on the ground that employment wages and hours have
a “substantial effect” on the interstate economy).
45. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
46. Id. at 113–28.
47. Id. at 120–25.
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“trivial” impact on interstate commerce, because Congress could
measure the “substantial effect” by aggregating all of the regulated
activity (such as growing wheat at home) across the nation.48
Wickard’s “aggregation” concept made congressional power
virtually plenary, because just about any activity, when added up across
America, exerted a “substantial effect” on the interstate economy.49 To
remove any possible constraints, the Court in evaluating the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 announced that it would uphold a federal statute if
the Justices could think of a “rational basis” that Congress might have
had for determining that the regulated conduct “substantially affected”
interstate commerce, regardless of whether Congress had actually
provided any supporting evidence.50 For the next three decades, this
exceedingly lax standard of review led to the automatic approval of all
challenged federal legislation, most importantly that dealing with major
crimes and the environment.51
This blind judicial deference came to a halt in United States v.
Lopez,52 when Chief Justice William Rehnquist and his four
conservative colleagues struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act
(GFSZA), which had made it a crime to possess a firearm within a
thousand feet of a school.53 Despite seemingly contrary precedent,54 the
Court asserted that congressional attempts to take over subjects of
48. Id. at 127–28.
49. Predictably, the Court sustained every federal statute passed under the Commerce
Clause for nearly six decades. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 38, at 79–88 (citing precedent).
50. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255–58 (1964);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298, 303–05 (1964).
51. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 38, at 86–88 (summarizing decisions upholding
federal criminal and environmental laws).
52. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
53. Id. at 551–68.
54. Four dissenters argued that the Court’s long-settled case law dictated the holding that
Congress could rationally have found that the possession and use of guns near schools,
considered in the aggregate, had a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce (for instance, by
compromising students’ ability to learn, which reduced their economic prospects). See id. at
602–03 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.); id. at 603–15 (Souter, J., dissenting); id.
at 615–44 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Indeed, Lopez conflicted with two established doctrines. First, the relevant inquiry was not
whether the regulated conduct was innately “commercial,” but rather whether it “substantially
affected” interstate commerce. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258; Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 120–25 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37, 40
(1937). Second, if that test were met, Congress could legislate without any independent
limitations imposed by Tenth Amendment notions of preserving islands of state authority. See,
e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 119–24 (1940); cf. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120–25.
Moreover, one contrary case seemed to be directly on point, as the Court had previously
acknowledged Congress’s power to ban the possession of guns (e.g., by felons). See
Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 569–77 (1977). The majority’s attempts to
distinguish such precedent were unconvincing.
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“traditional state concern” (like crime and education) warranted more
rigorous application of the “substantial effects” test.55 This newly
aggressive approach would result in invalidating laws such as the
GFSZA that did not concern activity that was “commercial,” considered
either by itself or as “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic
activity.”56
Unfortunately, the Court did not explain why it had long sustained
federal statutes that encroached on areas of “traditional state concern”
(including many criminal and educational laws) whenever Congress had
concluded that economic and social changes had transformed such
formerly local subjects into ones of national interest.57 Was such
entrenched federal legislation now vulnerable to attack, or would
Lopez’s heightened scrutiny apply only to new statutes? Similarly
confusing was the Court’s insistence that Congress could regulate only
“commerce” while refusing to define that word, which left its meaning
to be fleshed out piecemeal in future cases.58 Another problem with
Lopez was its failure to identify any objective criteria (e.g., dollar
amounts) to distinguish “substantial” from “insubstantial” effects on
interstate commerce.59 Not surprisingly, these vague standards provided
little concrete guidance for lower federal courts.
The Court did little to clarify analysis in United States v. Morrison,60
which struck down a provision of the recently enacted Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA) that granted a federal civil remedy to victims of
gender-motivated assaults.61 The five conservative Justices held that
Congress had interfered with a matter of “traditional state concern”
(criminal and tort law) and lacked a rational basis for finding that sexist
violence was “commerce” (either of itself or as part of a broader
economic regulatory program) or “substantially affected” interstate
commerce.62
Lopez and Morrison involved two novel, largely symbolic statutes
that duplicated existing state laws.63 When asked to invalidate longestablished and significant federal legislation addressing drug crimes,

55. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577, 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see id. at 561 (majority
opinion).
56. Id. at 561 (majority opinion).
57. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Does Congress Have the Constitutional Power to Prohibit
Partial-Birth Abortion?, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 319, 331–32 (2005).
58. Id. at 331.
59. See id.
60. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
61. Id. at 601–19.
62. Id. at 617–18.
63. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause
Counter-Revolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879, 882–97 (2005) .
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however, Justices Scalia and Kennedy faltered. In Gonzales v. Raich,64
they sided with the four Lopez and Morrison dissenters in ruling that
Congress could have had a rational basis for determining that it must
criminalize noncommercial action within a state—growing, possessing,
and using marijuana for medical purposes as directed by state law—to
carry into effect its overall regulation of interstate economic activity
(marijuana trafficking).65 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O’Connor and Thomas dissented on the ground that Congress had
invaded areas of “traditional state concern” (crime and medical care)
and had targeted people who were not engaged in “commerce,” as they
had not bought or sold marijuana.66
Some commentators accused Justices Scalia and Kennedy of
sacrificing their federalism principles to further the conservative policy
aim of maintaining a tough antidrug stance.67 Whatever the merits of
that charge, the legal standards in Lopez and Morrison were flexible
enough to enable those Justices to distinguish these two cases as
concerning congressional attempts to reach activity (such as genderbased violence) that cannot sensibly be treated as “commercial,” either
inherently or as part of a broader economic regulatory scheme.
Furthermore, Raich suggested that the enhanced scrutiny of Lopez and
Morrison would be applied only to relatively new federal statutes that
had never before been challenged, not to those that had previously been
sustained. Because very few laws enacted under the Commerce Clause
are both novel and entirely noncommercial, legal analysts from across
the political spectrum read Raich as sounding the death knell for the
Court’s quest to impose limits on Congress.68 I rejected this prevailing
wisdom:
[I]t is impossible to determine whether the majority or the
dissent [in Raich] correctly applied the Lopez and Morrison
standards, because they are so malleable as to justify either
result. Moreover, as the Justices implement these standards
prudentially on a case-by-case basis, it is unwise to
extrapolate far-reaching implications from any single
decision. Just as many scholars prematurely heralded Lopez
as the beginning of a Commerce Clause revolution, others
now may be too quick to characterize Raich as the end.
64. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
65. See id. at 5–33.
66. See id. at 42–57 (O’Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.); id. at 74
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
67. See Randy E. Barnett, Limiting Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 743, 743 (2005);
David Bernstein, Originalism in Crisis, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 2, 2005, 4:34 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2005/11/02/originalism-in-crisis/.
68. See Pushaw, supra note 63, at 883–84, 907–08 (describing this consensus).
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Finally, the Court’s discretionary application of protean
standards guarantees both accusations of political
manipulation and continuous uncertainty for Congress,
lower court judges, and lawyers.69
The Obamacare case fulfilled my prediction.
2. The National Federation Opinions
Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
and Alito, held that Congress lacked power to enact the IM under the
Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses.70 At the threshold, they
emphasized that the ACA represented the first time Congress had ever
relied upon the Commerce Clause to force people who were not
participating in commerce to buy an unwanted product.71 That unbroken
practice reflected the common-sense understanding that the phrase “to
regulate Commerce” presupposes existing commercial activity to be
regulated, not legislatively commanding the creation of such
commerce.72
Indeed, the Court noted that it had always read the Commerce
Clause as extending only to commercial “activity,” thereby excluding
inactivity.73 Letting Congress reach inaction through the IM would open
up a vast legislative domain in which the federal government could
compel Americans to buy anything (e.g., vegetables to improve health)
69. See id. at 884 (footnotes omitted).
70. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585–93 (2012) (Roberts,
C.J.); accord id. at 2644–50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
71. See id. at 2586 (Roberts, C.J.); accord id. at 2644–46 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito, JJ., dissenting). Concededly, Congress had occasionally required Americans to act (e.g.,
serving on juries, filing taxes, registering for the draft, and buying firearms for militia service),
but those mandates were not passed under the Commerce Clause and instead involved basic
obligations of citizenship. See id. at 2586 n.3 (Roberts, C.J.); Barnett, Commandeering, supra
note 16, at 630–32. But see Dan T. Coenen, Originalism and the “Individual Mandate”:
Rounding Out the Government’s Case for Constitutionality, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 55,
64–65 (2012) (arguing that Congress should have the same ability to use mandates as a means to
execute its power under the Commerce Clause as it does under other Article I provisions,
including those that address citizenship duties).
72. “[T]o regulate” means “to adjust by rule or method,” which assumes existing activity
that requires adjustment. Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2587 n.4 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2644 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). If “regulation” included creation, then many
constitutional clauses would be superfluous. Id. at 2586–87 (Roberts, C.J.) (illustrating this
point with several examples, such as the Constitution’s separate provisions authorizing Congress
to create the armed forces and regulate them); id. at 2644 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito,
JJ., dissenting) (same).
73. Id. at 2587–91 (Roberts, C.J.) (citing an unbroken line of cases stretching from Jones
& Laughlin to Raich); id. at 2643, 2646, 2648–50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.,
dissenting) (similar); see also Barnett, Commandeering, supra note 16, at 587–607 (developing
the “activity vs. inactivity” distinction).
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and then assert that its own mandate has produced a “substantial effect”
on the interstate economy.74 The majority distinguished Wickard as
involving a congressional regulation of commercial wheat farmers
whose activities exerted a significant national impact, not an attempt to
require consumers to purchase a commodity.75 While conceding that
inactivity might substantially affect interstate commerce, the five
Republican Justices cautioned that granting Congress power to address
non-action would profoundly change the citizen’s relationship to the
federal government, which would become virtually unrestrained.76 And
the Court would not allow this fundamental constitutional limit on
Congress to be evaded through two stratagems.
The first was the government’s claim that the “inactivity” of not
buying insurance was actually the “activity” of relying on one’s assets
(or on others) to pay for health care when it was needed later.77 The
majority rejected that notion because Congress could regulate only
existing commercial health care activities, not a class of individuals
(such as the uninsured) who were not currently engaged in such
commerce but who might be at some unknown future time.78
Secondly, the Court refused to permit Congress to invoke the
Necessary and Proper Clause to aggrandize new “substantive” powers
(such as regulating people who were not engaged in commercial
activity), because that Clause authorized only laws that were “derivative
of” and “incidental to” another enumerated power (like the Commerce
Clause).79 Hence, the IM was not a “proper” means to implement the
74. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2587–88 (Roberts, C.J.); see also id. at 2649–50 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
75. See id. at 2587–88 (Roberts, C.J.) (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 114–15,
127–29 (1942)); see also id. at 2643, 2648 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting)
(similar).
76. See id. at 2588 (Roberts, C.J.); see also id. at 2645–49 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito, JJ., dissenting) (same).
77. See id. at 2589–90 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2647–49 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito, JJ., dissenting).
78. See id. at 2590–91 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2647–48 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito, JJ., dissenting). The Chief Justice denied that the Commerce Clause licensed Congress to
control each citizen “from cradle to grave, simply because he will predictably engage in
particular transactions. Any police power to regulate individuals as such, as opposed to their
activities, remains vested in the States.” Id. at 2591 (Roberts, C.J.).
Furthermore, he rejected the government’s argument that these basic constitutional
principles should be disregarded because health insurance was a unique market that was
inextricably linked to the consumption and financing of medical services. See id. (pointing out
that insurance and health care services were separate products provided by different companies
at different times). But see Metzger, supra note 24, at 93–95 (contending that Roberts could
have saved the IM under the Commerce Clause by restricting its applicability to those who had
participated in the activity of obtaining health care, as contrasted with people who had remained
wholly outside of this market).
79. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2591–93 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2646 (Scalia, Kennedy,
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Commerce Clause because it subverted basic constitutional structural
principles, most notably limited and enumerated federal powers.80
Finally, the majority observed that Congress could have accomplished
its objectives though other means, unlike in other situations.81 The
Republican Justices, then, would not enable Congress to invoke the
Necessary and Proper Clause as a bootstrap to grab power it did not
possess under the Commerce Clause.
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan,
dissented on the ground that the Court’s longstanding precedent
required deference to Congress, which could rationally have found that
the ACA regulates economic subjects that, viewed in the aggregate,
substantially affected interstate commerce.82 Justice Ginsburg
characterized the IM as addressing not merely insurance, but also
Americans’ larger decisions about how to pay for the health care that all
of them will eventually need.83 She emphasized that most people cannot
afford to buy medical services out-of-pocket and thus purchase
insurance.84 Nonetheless, millions of uninsured Americans access health
care services and goods (often at emergency rooms where, by law, they
must be treated) but never pay, thereby shifting enormous costs to the
insured (who are charged higher premiums) or to taxpayers.85 Such
conduct, Justice Ginsburg concluded, had a significant impact on
interstate commerce that warranted federal intervention.86
Furthermore, she argued that the Commerce Clause, as written and
as interpreted, did not make the economically untenable distinction
between “activity” and “inactivity.”87 Indeed, the Court in Wickard
Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
80. See id. at 2592–93 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2646 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito,
JJ., dissenting). Here the Court adopted the position articulated by Barnett, Commandeering,
supra note 16, at 595–601, 604–07, 618–37.
81. Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2591–93 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2646–47 (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). For example, Raich concerned a statute that prohibited the
possession and use of marijuana, which was the only feasible way to effectuate the larger
legislative scheme of banning interstate commerce in marijuana. See id. at 2592–93 (Roberts,
C.J.); id. at 2646–47 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
82. See id. at 2609–28 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
83. See id. at 2610–11, 2620; see also id. at 2617 (asserting that those who choose not to
get insurance are making an “economic” decision).
84. See id. at 2610 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
85. See id. at 2610–11, 2619–20, 2623 (stressing that such “free riding” did not occur in
any other businesses, and that therefore upholding the IM would not provide legal authorization
for Congress to issue mandates as to other enterprises); see also ACA, 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(F),
(G) (2012) (finding that health care given to the uninsured amounts to $43 billion a year and that
those costs were passed on to the insured).
86. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2612–15 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part); see also id. at 2612 (maintaining that states cannot resolve this problem on their own
because any state that grants universal health insurance will be at a competitive disadvantage).
87. See id. at 2621–23.
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explicitly recognized that Congress could “‘[f]orc[e] some farmers into
the market to buy what they could provide for themselves.’”88 Likewise,
Justice Ginsburg cited cases such as Wickard and Raich that had
sustained federal legislation addressing current noncommercial conduct
simply because of its likely future effect on interstate commerce.89
Finally, she contended that, even assuming the IM did extend to
noncommercial and local subjects, the Necessary and Proper Clause
authorized Congress to determine that the IM was an “‘essential par[t]
of a larger regulation of economic activity’ . . . [in which] ‘the
regulatory scheme could be undercut’” unless the intrastate activity
were regulated.90 Here Congress’s broad commercial regulatory scheme
of providing affordable medical insurance for all Americans would be
undermined without the IM.91
3. Problems with the Court’s Analysis
Many scholars have asserted that National Federation represents a
seismic shift in jurisprudence under the Commerce and Necessary and
Proper Clauses that threatens the modern social welfare state.92 Perhaps
such a revolution is underway, but it is worth remembering that Lopez
prompted similar dire warnings, which Raich exposed as wildly
exaggerated.93 Therefore, we should resist the temptation to read too
much into any one decision.
Rather, I submit that National Federation continues the
Lopez/Morrison/Raich pattern of a divided Court prudentially applying
standards so flexible that they can plausibly justify either upholding or
invalidating most challenged federal statutes, which fuels suspicion that
results reflect politics rather than law.94 These problems intensify when
the Court considers an issue of first impression, such as whether the
88. See id. at 2621 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942)).
89. See id. at 2617–20.
90. See id. at 2625–26 (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24–25 (2005)). Justice
Ginsburg found unpersuasive the Chief Justice’s arguments that (1) the IM was not “proper”
even if it was “necessary,” and (2) “incidental” powers could meaningfully be distinguished
from “substantive” ones. See id. at 2626–28.
91. See id. at 2613–15, 2617, 2625–26 (contending that the IM was necessary because
otherwise the ACA’s “guaranteed issue” of insurance would allow freeloaders to wait until they
had a significant injury or illness to purchase a policy). The IM did not require buying an
unwanted product, because at some point everyone will need (and want) health care, and
Congress simply concluded that they must pay for it in advance through insurance rather than at
the time of service (when funds might not be available). Id. at 2617–20.
92. See supra notes 13, 24–26 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
94. See supra Subsection I.A.1. I previously sketched the following analysis in Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., Obamacare and the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause: Identifying
Historical Limits on Congress’s Powers, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1703, 1743–53.
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Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to impose purchase mandates.95
Thus, it was hardly surprising in National Federation that two groups of
Justices answered that question in polar opposite ways based upon
radically different understandings of the governing precedent.
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
and Alito, emphasized that the Commerce Clause has always been
interpreted as reaching only existing commercial “activity,” not
“inactivity.”96 They were correct in the sense that virtually every
modern Commerce Clause decision says that Congress can regulate
“activity” that substantially affects interstate commerce.97 But the
Republican Justices ignored a critical point: The Court in these opinions
never mentioned “inactivity” because all of the legislation under review
addressed affirmative conduct.98 Rather, cases like Lopez, Morrison,
and Raich were contrasting “commercial” activity with
“noncommercial” activity.99 Therefore, whether Congress could
regulate “inactivity” was an open question.
Moreover, the majority assumed that there was a bright line
separating “activity” from “inactivity.” This distinction, however, often
depends on how one characterizes the facts, especially in the
commercial context.100 For instance, the conservative Justices found it
obvious that people who do not buy insurance are “inactive,” whereas
Justice Ginsburg thought that those who choose to remain uninsured but
consume medical services are “active.”101 A similar debate might arise
in other contexts. For example, is someone who holds stock rather than
selling it participating in commercial “activity”?102
95. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2642 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.,
dissenting) (noting this novelty).
96. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17–18, 20–26, 28–30, 32 (2005); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607–27 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552–57
(1995); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118–29 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
98. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d
1256, 1285–86 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 648 F.3d 1235, aff’d in part, rev’d
in part sub nom., Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. 2566.
99. See supra notes 52–69 and accompanying text (discussing these decisions); see also
Leslie Meltzer Henry & Maxwell L. Stearns, Commerce Games and the Individual Mandate,
100 GEO. L.J. 1117, 1127–30 (2012) (noting that the Court simply restricted Congress to
regulating “commercial” subjects, without considering whether they took an active or passive
form).
100. See Metzger, supra note 24, at 93–95, 98–99 (criticizing the Court for holding that
Congress could not constitutionally regulate “inactivity,” but failing to define that word).
101. See supra notes 71–76, 82–90 and accompanying text.
102. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 561 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J.,
concurring in part). It is worth noting that Judge Sutton, a conservative Republican, thought that
the Court’s Commerce Clause precedent obliged him to uphold the ACA. Id. at 554–66.
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The Court’s liberal and conservative wings also contested the
applicability of Wickard and Raich. To Justice Ginsburg, these
decisions dictated deferring to Congress’s reasonable judgment that the
IM would help to effectuate its interstate commercial regulation of
health insurance.103 To the Republican Justices, however, neither of
these cases authorized a statutory provision that forced inactive
Americans into a particular market.104 For instance, Wickard involved a
commercial farmer who was actively growing wheat.105 Raich went
further by permitting federal marijuana laws to be applied to
noncommercial users, but even they were engaged in activity
(cultivating and smoking marijuana for medical purposes).106 The ACA
took another—and bigger—step by targeting Americans precisely
because they were inactive in a specific market (medical insurance).107
Indeed, Congress’s own legal analysts acknowledged that the IM was
unprecedented.108
The majority treated an unbroken legislative practice (such as never
imposing a commercial mandate) as strong evidence that Congress did
not possess such power.109 Although that argument sounds logical,
accepting it would result in striking down all innovative Commerce
Clause statutes that respond to modern problems. For example, the
Court should have invalidated New Deal legislation because Congress
had not previously regulated subjects such as agriculture, labor, and
banking.110 That same reasoning would have doomed more recent
important laws, such as those prohibiting employment discrimination
103. See Nat’l of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2617–23 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). Many judges and scholars had previously reached the
same conclusion. See, e.g., Thomas More, 651 F.3d at 542–47; Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d
16, 29–40 (D.D.C. 2011); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 630–34 (W.D.
Va. 2010); Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (2010); Coenen, supra note
71, at 71–72.
104. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2587–88, 2590–93 (Roberts, C.J.) (pointing out that
these cases did not concern congressional attempts to compel people to purchase goods or
services); id. at 2646–48 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). For similar
arguments, see, e.g., Barnett, Commandeering, supra note 16, at 605, 615–20; Richard A.
Epstein, Judicial Engagement with the Affordable Care Act: Why Rational Basis Analysis Falls
Short, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 931, 938 (2012).
105. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 113–28 (1942). See generally supra notes 45–
48 and accompanying text.
106. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32–33 (2005). See generally supra notes 64–67
and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
108. See JENNIFER STAMAN & CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40725,
REQUIRING INDIVIDUALS TO OBTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 6
(2009).
109. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2586 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2649 (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
110. See supra notes 38–48 and accompanying text.
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and protecting the environment.111 Simply put, the novelty of a statutory
provision such as the IM should not be a significant factor in
determining its constitutionality.112
The foregoing analysis reveals that Commerce Clause precedent is
so malleable that it could have been applied to support either outcome
in National Federation. On balance, however, Justice Ginsburg
presented the better reading of this case law.
The core Commerce Clause principle established by the Rehnquist
Court was that Congress could legislate only as to activity that was
“commercial,” viewed either by itself or as “an essential part of a larger
regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could
be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.”113 In Lopez
and Morrison, the Court concluded that gun possession and gendermotivated violence were not “commercial,” either inherently or as a
necessary component of a broader interstate economic regulatory
scheme.114 By contrast, the majority in Raich deemed the growth,
possession, and use of marijuana to be “commercial”—not of itself but
rather because prohibiting this noneconomic, intrastate activity was “an
essential part of a larger regulation of [interstate] economic activity”
(the multibillion dollar national marijuana industry).115 The Court relied
heavily upon Wickard, which allowed Congress to penalize the
noncommercial, local growth of wheat as a necessary element of its
comprehensive economic regulation of the national wheat market.116
These Commerce Clause principles should have led the Court in
National Federation to focus on the undisputed fact that the ACA was a
broad regulatory scheme that addressed interstate “commercial” activity
(the nationwide health insurance business).117 The only remaining issue
under Lopez and its progeny was whether Congress had rationally
determined that the IM was an essential part of this economic regulatory
program.118 This test merely reformulates the standard of judicial
111. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
112. See Coenen, supra note 71, at 63–64 (maintaining that the original intent and
understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause was that it granted Congress discretion to
choose any means that would best accomplish future legislative goals in light of changing
circumstances that could not be foreseen); see also Karlan, supra note 23, at 48 (emphasizing
that the National Federation majority viewed the novelty of the ACA with suspicion, whereas
the Warren Court treated congressional innovation in addressing major economic and social
problems as a positive sign of responsiveness and resourcefulness).
113. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995), cited in Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1, 24 (2005), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000).
114. See supra notes 52–62 and accompanying text.
115. Raich, 545 U.S. at 5–33.
116. Id. at 17–20, 22, 33.
117. See ACA, 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(A) (2012) (congressional findings).
118. See supra notes 52–65, 113–16 and accompanying text.
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review under the Necessary and Proper Clause that has come to be
associated with McCulloch v. Maryland119: Was Congress’s choice of
means (the IM) reasonably related to achieving a legitimate legislative
end (regulating interstate commerce in medical insurance)?120 For two
centuries, the Court has routinely deferred to such discretionary
legislative judgments, as Justice Ginsburg stressed.121
Although precedent supported the dissent’s arguments and
conclusions, it hardly dictated them. Rather, the majority plausibly
interpreted the relevant cases as reinforcing the straightforward textual
meaning of the Commerce Clause: that it authorizes Congress to
regulate existing commercial activity, not to compel Americans to buy
certain things.122 It is impossible to say definitively which side is right,
because the Court has adopted amorphous standards and applied them
in common law fashion based on the facts and circumstances of each
case.
In sum, National Federation and the Lopez/Morrison/Raich trilogy
establish that Congress can regulate only “activity” that is
“commercial.” These two limits, however, hang on the vote of one
Justice, as the four liberals have never really accepted Lopez and are
unlikely to follow National Federation’s Commerce Clause doctrine.123
119. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
120. Id. at 406–15.
121. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2615–17, 2625–27 (2012)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (invoking the unbroken line of precedent
since McCulloch to argue that the majority should have acceded to Congress’s policy
determination that the IM was a rational means of implementing its valid Commerce Clause
regulation of the health insurance industry); see also Coenen, supra note 71, at 57, 66–69
(similar).
To be clear, I do not think that the Court’s previous blind deference comports with the
original meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, which was never intended as a font of
unbridled discretion that would enable Congress to skirt the limits on its Commerce Clause
power. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 38, at 29, 56–57, 83, 98–100. Moreover, recent
scholarship has demonstrated that the Court in McCulloch correctly adopted a fairly limited
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause, but then began to misread the opinion as
recognizing extraordinarily broad congressional power. See infra note 128 and accompanying
text. Thus, my point is that the post-McCulloch precedent supported Justice Ginsburg=s
conclusions, not that these cases accurately captured the historical meaning of the Necessary and
Proper Clause.
122. See supra notes 7, 70–81 and accompanying text.
123. Justice Ginsburg joined the dissenters (Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer) in United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). These four Justices adhered to their position in United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). A few years later, they persuaded Justices Kennedy
and Scalia to join them in severely circumscribing Lopez and Morrison by allowing Congress to
control activity that was concededly noncommercial (growing, possessing, and smoking
marijuana for personal medical purposes) because it was part of a broader regulation of
interstate commerce. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). Justices Stevens and Souter
have been succeeded by Sotomayor and Kagan, who joined Justice Ginsburg’s National
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Taking a longer view, for the past eight decades not a single Democratic
Justice has voted to curb Congress’s power. Therefore, if a Democratic
appointee replaces a Republican one, cases like Lopez, Morrison, and
National Federation will probably be overturned or “distinguished” into
irrelevance.124 If the conservatives cling to their slim majority, however,
National Federation may portend further restrictions on the Commerce
Power.
Many scholars have warned that such changes could be
revolutionary.125 They are justifiably concerned with two aspects of the
Obamacare case. First, the Court for the first time since 1936 ruled that
a significant Act of Congress (as contrasted with the trivial GFSZA and
VAWA) had exceeded the scope of the Commerce Clause.126 Second,
Chief Justice Roberts and his fellow Republicans abandoned the
longstanding judicial practice under the Necessary and Proper Clause of
respecting Congress’s choice of the means that it determined would best
effectuate its exercise of Article I powers.127 Instead, the conservative
Justices asserted independent authority to decide that a means was not
“proper” if it (1) was a “substantive” rather than “incidental” power,
and (2) conflicted with their vision of federalism128—a deeply contested
concept that inevitably implicates politics.129
Federation opinion endorsing plenary congressional power under the Commerce and Necessary
and Proper Clauses. See supra notes 82–91 and accompanying text. It is hard to imagine that the
four liberals will ever agree with their conservative colleagues’ attempts to restrain Congress’s
ability to address national economic and social problems.
124. See Gary Lawson, Night of the Living Dead: The Individual Mandate and the Zombie
Constitution, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1700 (2013) (stressing that National Federation=s
holdings as to the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses might not survive the next
Court vacancy).
125. See supra notes 13, 24–26, 92 and accompanying text.
126. See supra Subsection I.A.1.
127. See supra notes 79–81, 92, 119–21 and accompanying text.
128. Professor Lawson has argued that both of these determinations reflect the original
meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, which the Court in McCulloch correctly grasped
but has since misunderstood. See Lawson, supra note 124, at 1700–10. First, as the agent of the
People, Congress only has implied powers that are “incidental” to its “principal” (i.e.,
enumerated) powers. See id. at 1700–01, 1704–06, 1710 (relying on Robert G. Natelson, The
Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 243 (2004)).
Because the IM is a “principal” rather than “incidental” power, it cannot be enacted under the
Necessary and Proper Clause. Id. at 1706. Second, the IM is not “proper” because it cannot be
squared with the Constitution’s structural principles of limited federal government and reserved
state powers. Id. at 1703; see also Reynolds & Denning, supra note 27, at 829–30 (praising the
Court for enhancing scrutiny of Congress’s assertion of authority under the Necessary and
Proper Clause).
129. The Court’s newly muscular approach to the Necessary and Proper Clause, however,
did not ultimately result in the invalidation of the ACA, which was upheld under the Taxing
Power. See infra notes 163, 188–206 and accompanying text. Indeed, it would be surprising if
the Court ever struck down a law as not “proper” under federalism principles, because doing so
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Despite these innovations, I predict that National Federation will
have a minimal impact on Commerce Clause jurisprudence.130 The main
reason is that, from 1937 until 1994, the Court upheld all laws enacted
under this Clause—including those dealing with crucial matters such as
labor and employment, agricultural policy, discrimination, the
environment, and interstate crimes.131 All of the Justices except Thomas
have accepted such precedent as settled, and even he has conceded that
it will not be reversed because of stare decisis and practical
considerations.132 That is precisely why the conservative Justices have
targeted only new statutes that rest on a particularly expansive reading
of the Commerce Clause.133 But even that modest approach may not
succeed. Most notably, the Rehnquist Court’s only attempt to restrict
Congress—the “commerce” requirement—lost steam within a
decade.134
National Federation’s “activity” limit may similarly fade into
insignificance. In fact, it may never be applied again because no other
Commerce Clause law in history has imposed an economic mandate on
inactive people, and there is no evidence that Congress intends to use
this mechanism again.135 Furthermore, even if Congress does try to
regulate inactivity in the future, and even if the conservative Justices
maintain their majority, they might again fail to muster the collective
fortitude needed to strike down major federal legislation. After all,
Justices Scalia and Kennedy could not bring themselves to invalidate
key federal drug laws,136 and Chief Justice Roberts ultimately
concluded that Congress could address “inactivity” (as an exercise of its
Taxing Power).137 Indeed, National Federation suggests that merely
articulating Commerce Clause limits will do little to restrain Congress
because the Court will sustain the statute anyway as a tax—even when
federal legislators and the President unequivocally assure Americans
that it is not.138
would threaten separation of powers by overturning Congress’s discretionary policy judgments.
See infra notes 329–32, 338 and accompanying text.
130. Other commentators share this assessment. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 24, at 113.
131. See supra notes 41–51 and accompanying text.
132. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 601 & n.8 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
133. See supra notes 52–69 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 52–69, 93, 113–116 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 7, 71–76, 95–99, 107–109 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text.
137. See infra Subsection I.B.2.a.; see also Michael Dorf, Commerce, Death Panels, and
Broccoli: Or Why the Activity/Inactivity Distinction in the Health Care Case Was Really About
the Right to Bodily Integrity, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 897, 898, 901–03 (2013) (contending that
the “activity” restriction is fairly harmless because Congress rarely adopts mandates and, after
National Federation, can still impose them under the Taxing Clause).
138. See infra notes 228–48, 255, 274–75, 340–57 and accompanying text.
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In sum, National Federation is probably not an omen of radical
transformation of Commerce Clause doctrine. Rather, the case
illustrates the Court’s post-1994 trend of keeping its basic analytical
framework intact but crafting a few minor modifications.
4. The Neo-Federalist Alternative: Restricting Congress to the
Regulation of Voluntary, Market-Based Activity
The Court’s Commerce Clause decisions have long been heavily
influenced by politics. Most importantly, liberal Justices concocted the
basic “substantially affects interstate commerce” and “aggregation”
principles to uphold the New Deal in response to Democratic Party
demands.139 Similarly, the Warren Court added the “rational basis” test
to make it even easier to sustain the Great Society laws that these
Justices favored.140 More recently, five Republican Justices created the
“commerce” and “activity” limits, which happen to further the
conservative political agenda of constraining the federal government
and protecting the states’ reserved powers.141
In short, the Justices have devised nebulous standards and applied
them case-by-case to reach results that usually track their political
preferences. This approach will never produce doctrinal coherence or
confidence in the Court’s impartiality. Therefore, the Justices should
consider an alternative: articulating and adhering to clear legal rules that
are rooted in the Commerce Clause’s language and history. The only
Justice who has proposed doing so, Clarence Thomas, maintains that
Congress should regulate “commerce” (which he claims originally
meant only the sale and transportation of goods) that occurs “among the
several States” (a phrase he would interpret restrictively as “crossing
state lines”).142 The other Justices have understandably refused to adopt
Thomas’s position because it would force them to overturn nearly eight
decades of precedent and dismantle the modern administrative and
social welfare state.143
Yet fidelity to the Commerce Clause’s text, history, and early
implementing precedent does not require such a drastic and impractical
course of action. As Grant Nelson and I have demonstrated, Justice
139. See supra notes 41–49 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 52–62, 70–81 and accompanying text. This general ideological goal
of restoring traditional federalism, however, can be ignored where doing so promotes specific
Republican policies, such as maximizing federal power to fight the “War on Drugs.” See supra
notes 64–67 and accompanying text (discussing the decision of Justices Scalia and Kennedy to
join the Raich holding that Congress could prohibit even noncommercial and local marijuana
possession and use authorized by state law).
142. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585–86, 591, 594–96 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
143. See supra notes 42–51, 63–67 and accompanying text.
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Thomas appears to be unaware of historical evidence revealing that the
Commerce Clause had a far broader scope which can justify most (but
not all) modern legislation.144 We employed a “Neo-Federalist”
methodology, which initially requires discerning a constitutional
provision’s original “meaning” (i.e., its common contemporaneous
definition), the “intent” of its Framers, and the “understanding” of its
Ratifiers.145 Next, those original Federalist principles are refined in light
of subsequent congressional and judicial interpretations, with the aim of
formulating workable legal rules that can be applied impartially and
without quixotically expecting the Court to overturn the results in
almost all of its cases.146
This Neo-Federalist inquiry yielded two concrete Commerce Clause
rules. First, Congress can only regulate “commerce,” which we defined
as “the voluntary sale or exchange of property or services and all
accompanying market-based activities, enterprises, relationships, and
interests.”147 Second, this “commerce” must extend “among the several
States” (i.e., either cross a state border or occur within one state but
affect others).148 Such an interstate impact can almost always be found
in America’s integrated national economy.149 Thus, the validity of most
statutes would depend on whether they meet our definition of
“commerce,” which is broad yet bounded.
A big advantage of our “market oriented” approach is that it would
not change the results in the vast majority of Commerce Clause cases
(although it would alter the rationale).150 As a starting point, we agree
with Justice Thomas (and everyone else) that Congress can regulate
interstate sales of goods and paid transportation.151 But we would go far
beyond that core to uphold statutes in three other areas. The first is the
production of goods (through manufacturing, mining, farming, and the
like) intended for sale, as well as their environmental, safety, and health
144. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 38, at 6–67.
145. For a detailed explanation of this general mode of constitutional analysis, see, e.g.,
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., A Neo-Federalist Analysis of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 95 CALIF. L.
REV. 1515, 1516, 1541–42 (2007); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Congressional Power over Federal
Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Neo-Federalist Interpretation of Article III, 1997 BYU L.
REV. 847, 847, 849–51. We specifically used this methodology in the Commerce Clause context
in two articles: Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 38; Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A
Critique of the Narrow Interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 695 (2002). I
defended Neo-Federalism as superior to other approaches (e.g., textualism, structuralism,
precedent-centered analysis, and living constitutionalism) in Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Methods of
Interpreting the Commerce Clause: A Comparative Analysis, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1185 (2003).
146. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 38, at 8–9.
147. Id. at 9; see also id. at 107–10 (fleshing out this definition).
148. Id. at 10–11, 110–11.
149. Id. at 110.
150. Id. at 119.
151. Id. at 9–10, 101, 108–09, 119–20.
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externalities.152 The second consists of compensated services in addition
to transportation (such as banking, insurance, and public
accommodations), including antitrust and antidiscrimination laws that
ensure a free market in these services.153 The third category concerns
crimes that involve the voluntary sale of goods (like illegal drugs) or
services (such as prostitution, gambling, and loan sharking).154
In short, the Nelson/Pushaw proposal would allow almost all major
Commerce Clause legislation, but through the application of precise
legal rules that are grounded in the historical meaning of that Clause.155
We would, however, impose certain limits. Most significantly for
present purposes, “commerce” includes only voluntary (not required)
market-oriented actions.156 Furthermore, “commerce” excludes acts
done to satisfy individual or home needs.157 For example, we would
permit Congress to regulate the production of agricultural commodities
that are intended for sale in the marketplace, but not the growth of
wheat and marijuana for personal use (contrary to Wickard and Raich).
Finally, our interpretation bars Congress from interfering with the
states’ control over purely moral, social, or cultural matters (such as
violent crime).158
Application of our two-pronged Commerce Clause legal framework
would have led to upholding almost all of the ACA. First, Congress can
legislate about health insurance, which involves selling products and
services in the market. Indeed, we have always maintained that
Congress can regulate insurance, which has long been a vital “branch of
commerce” (to use a common eighteenth-century phrase).159 Second,
medical insurance plainly has effects “among the States.” Yet one
critical provision of Obamacare—the IM—would be invalid, as
Congress cannot force people to buy insurance because such contracts
would not be voluntary sales. As the IM does not regulate “commerce,”
it is unnecessary to proceed to the second step and determine interstate
economic impacts.
Before the ACA, Congress implicitly grasped the volitional nature of
152. See id. at 9, 120–24.
153. Id. at 9–10, 119–20, 124–25.
154. Id. at 10, 125–41. Finally, Congress can protect specifically identified persons and
entities engaged in interstate commerce (such as retail stores and abortion clinics) against
criminal or tortious misconduct. See id. at 10 n.40, 147–58.
155. By contrast, the Court has ignored the Clause’s language and history in cobbling
together the “substantial effects”/“aggregation”/“rational basis” test, with recent exceptions for
“noncommercial” conduct and “inactivity” (terms that are never defined). See supra Subsections
I.A.1–2.
156. Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 38, at 9, 107.
157. Id. at 109–10.
158. Id. at 10–12, 27, 41, 78, 109–10.
159. Id. at 10, 13, 15, 17, 19, 85, 108.
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“commerce” because it never ordered Americans to buy specific
items.160 To ignore this basic element of free will and approve the IM
would open up a Pandora’s Box in which Congress could compel all
citizens to purchase anything (be it a refrigerator, legal services, or
whiskey)161 on the theory that their failure to enter such markets is
actually “commercial” activity that “substantially affects” the interstate
economy.162
In sum, the Nelson/Pushaw approach would have led to the same
result as that reached by Chief Justice Roberts and his Republican
cohorts, but through a straightforward application of clear legal rules
rooted in the Commerce Clause. Because we set forth our analysis long
before Obamacare was enacted, we cannot be accused of inventing a
new test (such as the “activity vs. inactivity” distinction) to justify a
preferred political outcome. The Court would be wise to “tie itself to the
mast” in a similar manner by precommitting itself to abide by fixed
legal rules.

160. See supra notes 7, 71–76, 95–99, 107–09, 135 and accompanying text.
161. Professor Dorf argues that the Court in National Federation could have limited
mandates to “economic” activity (such as purchasing goods) rather than “noneconomic” activity
(for example, consuming products like food). Dorf, supra note 137, at 905–09. The Commerce
Clause, however, authorizes Congress to regulate only “commerce” (voluntary market-based
activity), not compelled transactions that might have an “economic” impact. See Pushaw, supra
note 94, at 1706–10, 1743–54.
162. Our approach prevents Congress from addressing any perceived national problem
however it wishes. Although critics would consider such constraints a vice, I think they are a
virtue because they preserve the constitutional system of limited and enumerated powers. For
instance, Congress can regulate medical insurance, but must do so within the bounds of the
Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses. Interpreting those provisions as giving Congress
total discretion over health care and insurance would allow mandates to purchase not only
insurance but also fruits and vegetables, gym memberships, sleep aids, and anything else our
federal legislators deem beneficial. Permitting the exercise of such power removes any limits on
the federal government and concomitantly erodes individual liberty. See Pushaw, supra note 94,
at 1753 (summarizing the foregoing argument).
Critics would respond that such fears are baseless because the democratically accountable
federal legislators will not go to such extremes. See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 23, at 50–51. That
point is well taken, but the political process does not always function properly, as the ACA itself
illustrates. For example, Congress short-circuited its ordinary procedures to get Obamacare
through. See id. at 45 (acknowledging that Congress resorted to using the budget reconciliation
mechanism, rather than its usual legislative process, to avoid filibusters). Moreover, the
President and his legislative allies insisted that the IM was not a “tax,” but the Court concluded
that it was, thereby diminishing Congress’s accountability for raising taxes. See supra note 138
and accompanying text.
Finally, legislation that might seem farfetched today, but that is supported by elite opinion,
can acquire mainstream status fairly rapidly (witness the sea change over the past decade
regarding same-sex marriage). Perhaps local bans on unhealthy food (such as soda) are a
harbinger of national change.
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B. The Taxing Clause
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan, held that the IM could reasonably be
characterized as a “tax” and was a valid exercise of Congress’s Taxing
Power.163 The remaining four Justices, however, persuasively rejected
this interpretation as implausible.164 I will explain my agreement with
the dissenters after reviewing the relevant legal background and the
competing opinions.
1. The Taxing Power: History and Precedent
Article I authorizes Congress “[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”165 The Taxing
Clause enabled the new national government to finance its operations
by taxing individuals and private entities directly. By contrast, the
Articles of Confederation had relied upon states to voluntarily comply
with Congress’s requisition requests, which resulted in disastrous free
rider and collective action problems that bankrupted the central
government.166
The Taxing Clause confers fiscal power to raise revenue and, unlike
the Commerce Clause, does not grant independent regulatory authority
(beyond regulations necessary to assess and collect taxes).167
Nonetheless, it has always been understood that taxes often both
generate funds for the government and promote a regulatory goal, such
as protecting American industries.168 Thus, the Court has long sustained
tax measures as long as they raised revenue, even if they also had a
163. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594–601 (2012) (Roberts,
C.J.); accord id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The Court
appeared to rely heavily on, but did not cite, the analysis set forth by Cooter & Siegel, supra
note 10, at 1196–200, 1236–53.
164. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2650–55 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.,
dissenting); see also Barnett, Commandeering, supra note 16, at 607–14 (setting forth the
arguments that were later adopted by the joint dissent).
165. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison)
(contending that this Clause had the modest purpose of ensuring that the federal government had
adequate revenue to pay off its debts, fund the military, and promote America’s welfare
primarily by facilitating international commerce).
166. For descriptions of how the Constitution addressed this problem of ensuring that the
federal government had adequate revenue, see Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 38, at 22–25, 34;
Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 1200–04.
167. See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 36–37 (1922).
168. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 38, at 22–25, 34, 50–51 (citing examples of this
understanding dating back to the Founding); Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 1200–10
(concluding that the Constitution was designed to provide for ample taxing power, which has
always been exercised both to raise revenue and to achieve regulatory ends, such as tariffs to
stimulate domestic manufacturing).
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regulatory purpose or effect.169 For example, in United States v.
Kahriger,170 the Court upheld a $50 annual tax on persons engaged in
the gambling business because this levy yielded revenue, even though
the amount was trivial and the law had the regulatory effect of
discouraging gambling.171 The Court declared that “[t]he remedy for
excessive taxation is in the hands of Congress, not the courts.”172 In
Kahriger and other cases, the Court justified its deference on the ground
that Congress had explicitly described the exaction as a “tax” and
therefore would face the political consequences of taxation.173 This
electoral accountability helps explain why the Court has not invalidated
any federal legislation as exceeding the Taxing Power since the Butler
case in 1936.174
No constitutional power is absolute, however. Most obviously, the
Taxing Clause limits Congress to laying and collecting “taxes.”
Congress cannot make any charge a “tax” merely by labeling it as
such,175 just as Congress cannot magically transform noncommercial
activity (like sexual assault) into “commerce” merely by asserting that it
is.176 Furthermore, the Taxing Clause allows Congress to impose a
“penalty” (that is, a coercive monetary punishment) solely for failure to
meet one’s tax obligations (for instance, late filing), not for violations of
other federal laws enacted under different powers such as the
Commerce Clause.177
A related point is that a federal statutory provision designated as a
“tax” may be struck down if it is in reality a “penalty” devised to punish
169. See, e.g., Bailey, 259 U.S. at 38; see also Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506,
512–14 (1937) (upholding a statutory Atax@ on firearms that was particularly onerous as to
certain types of guns, even though Congress also had a regulatory aim); McCray v. United
States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904) (sustaining a statute that imposed a vastly higher tax on artificially
colored yellow margarine than butter on the ground that the law produced revenue and that
Congress had the legitimate objective of discouraging adulteration of food products, despite the
fact that this tax also had the purpose of preferring manufacturers of butter rather than
margarine).
170. 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
171. See id. at 25–31.
172. Id. at 28; see also Barnett, Commandeering, supra note 16, at 609 (arguing that
Kahriger illustrated the Court’s post-New Deal approach of deferring to Congress’s assertion
that it was exercising its Taxing Power, even if there also may have been a regulatory motive).
173. See Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 28; Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513–14.
174. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (striking down a tax imposed under
the Agricultural Adjustment Act on processors of farm products as violating the Tenth
Amendment, which reserves agricultural production to the states). The Court permanently
reversed course the next year. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590–93 (1937)
(upholding the Social Security Act’s tax scheme for unemployment compensation).
175. See Erik M. Jensen, The Individual Mandate and the Taxing Power, 134 TAX NOTES
97, 103, 108 (2012).
176. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614–18 (2000).
177. Jensen, supra note 175, at 103–04.
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someone monetarily for violating a law intended to achieve a regulatory
purpose. For instance, in the seminal case of Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Co.,178 the Court invalidated a purported “tax” on employers who had
used child labor because it was actually a “penalty” for violating the
regulatory provision prohibiting such labor.179 Relevant factors in
making this determination included the large amount of the exaction,
the scienter requirement (i.e., employers would be liable only if they
knew the worker was underage), and the law’s enforcement by a
government agency other than the IRS (here, the Department of
Labor).180
Significantly, Congress resorted to the fiction that the regulatory
penalty for employing a child was a Atax@ because the Court had
narrowly construed the Commerce Clause as not permitting labor
legislation, much less penalties for violating such laws.181 When the
Court in 1937 abandoned that interpretation (and all serious judicial
review of the Commerce Clause), Congress could simply attach
penalties to its regulatory statutes without invoking the Taxing Power—
as it did in the ACA.182
In brief, when Congress “lays and collects taxes,” courts will
approve such laws as long as they raise revenue (which they invariably
do). Judicial review should be more searching, however, when the
plaintiff claims that Congress has not actually exercised its Taxing
Power, but rather has imposed a “penalty” for violating a regulatory
statute enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Obamacare fell
squarely into that category.
2. The National Federation Decision
The ACA triggered massive litigation. Every lower federal court that
considered whether the IM could be sustained as an Article I “tax” for
the “general Welfare” held that it could not because (1) Congress
explicitly disavowed reliance on the Taxing Clause and instead invoked
its Commerce Power; (2) the ACA repeatedly referred to the IM as a
regulatory “penalty,” not a “tax”; and (3) Supreme Court precedent
dictated treating the IM as a “penalty.”183 The federal courts’ opinions,
178. 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
179. Id. at 31–37.
180. See id. at 36–38; see also Dep’t of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779–82
(1994) (reaffirming that a purported “tax” would be treated as a “penalty” when it was really
intended to regulate behavior through punishment).
181. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272–76 (1918) (invalidating the Child Labor
Act).
182. See Jensen, supra note 175, at 102–03, 109.
183. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d
1235, 1313–20 (11th Cir. 2011) (articulating this rationale and noting that every federal court
had reached the same conclusion). Indeed, the inapplicability of the Taxing Power was clear
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and the unanimity of their decisions, reflect their view that the IM
clearly was not a tax and hence could not be upheld under the Taxing
Clause.184 Therefore, it was surprising that Chief Justice Roberts, in a
majority opinion joined by the four liberals, rejected this seemingly
obvious conclusion.185
This judgment was especially perplexing in light of the Court’s
initial 9–0 jurisdictional ruling that the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA),
which prohibits federal courts from enjoining “the assessment or
collection of any tax,” did not apply because Congress had described
the IM payment as a “penalty,” not a “tax.”186 This consensus broke
down when the Chief Justice and his four liberal colleagues insisted
that, even though this “penalty” label settled the statutory issue of
whether Congress intended the AIA to extend to the ACA, this choice
of words did not determine whether the payment might be regarded as
an exercise of Congress’s constitutional power to tax.187
a. Chief Justice Roberts’s Majority Opinion
Roberts conceded that the most “straightforward” and “natural”
reading of the IM is that it commands Americans to buy health
insurance as a regulation of interstate commerce and penalizes anyone
who fails to do so.188 Nevertheless, he invoked the Court’s canon of
construing statutes to avoid unconstitutionality if such an interpretation
was “fairly possible,” and ruled that the IM could reasonably be
characterized as levying a tax on those who do not purchase health
insurance—and hence within the Taxing Power.189 The majority found
this alternative construction to be plausible because the IM exaction
(1) was paid by taxpayers to the IRS, which had to assess and collect it
“‘in the same manner as taxes,’”190 and (2) “produces at least some
revenue for the Government.”191
even to judges like Jeffrey Sutton, who upheld the IM under the Commerce Clause. See Thomas
More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 550–52 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring); see
also supra note 102 (discussing Judge Sutton’s Commerce Clause analysis).
184. See, e.g., Florida v. HHS, 648 F.3d at 1314 (contrasting this clarity and unanimity
with the lower federal courts’ divisions on the complex Commerce Clause issues).
185. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593–600 (2012).
186. Id. at 2582–84; id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at
2655–56 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
187. Id. at 2594, 2597–98 (Roberts, C.J.). Justice Ginsburg tersely agreed with the Chief
Justice’s opinion on the Taxing Power. Id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part). On this issue, then, Roberts spoke with one voice for the majority.
188. Id. at 2593–94 (Roberts, C.J.).
189. Id. at 2593–94, 2600–01. But see id. at 2651 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.,
dissenting) (recognizing this canon of statutory construction, but concluding that the IM could
be plausibly interpreted only as a “penalty,” not a “tax”).
190. Id. at 2594 (Roberts, C.J.) (citing ACA, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(g)(1)).
191. Id. (citing United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28 n.4 (1953)).
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Moreover, the majority asserted that it did not have to accept the
ACA’s own description of the IM as a “penalty” rather than a “tax,”
because precedent indicated that such congressional labels did not
resolve the question of constitutional power.192 For example, in Drexel
Furniture, the Court concluded that a required payment which Congress
had designated as a “tax” was not a permissible exercise of the Taxing
Power.193 Conversely, in the License Tax Cases,194 a fee that the statute
deemed a “license” (to sell liquor and lottery tickets) was upheld under
the Taxing Clause.195
This precedent led the Court to adopt a “functional” approach to the
ACA based on Drexel Furniture’s three factors, which suggested that
the IM could be considered a “tax.”196 First, the amount of the exaction
was small—typically far less than the price of insurance.197 Second, the
IM contained no scienter requirement, unlike statutes which featured
regulatory penalties.198 Third, this law was enforced by the IRS through
its normal collection mechanism, but with no punitive sanctions.199
Furthermore, the Court noted that a “penalty” punished an illegal act,
whereas here Congress did not treat the failure to buy insurance as
unlawful and deserving of sanction (as contrasted with merely making a
relatively modest payment to the IRS).200 Thus, Congress’s use of the
word “penalty” in the IM did not preclude deeming the payment a
“tax,”201 and such an interpretation was reasonable.202
192. See id. at 2594–95.
193. See id. (citing Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922)).
194. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462 (1866).
195. Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2595 (Roberts, C.J.) (citing 72 U.S. at 471).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 2595–96.
198. Id. at 2596.
199. Id.
200. See id. at 2596–97. The Court relied upon New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992), which examined an Act of Congress that began with a general statement that each state
“shall be responsible” for disposing of radioactive waste and then specifically (1) imposed a
“surcharge” on a state that shipped such waste to another state, with part of the money going to
the receiving state and part deposited in the U.S. Treasury; and (2) imposed “penalties” on states
that did not comply. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2597 (Roberts, C.J.) (citing New York, 505
U.S. at 152–53, 169). The Court read this statute as giving states “incentives” to dispose of
radioactive waste and deemed the “surcharge” to be a legitimate exercise of the Taxing Power.
Id. at 2597 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 169–74).
However, the Court in New York merely declined to interpret the law’s introductory
provision—reciting that each state “shall be responsible” for disposing of radioactive waste—in
isolation as a command, but rather focused on the later operative provisions of the statute, which
indicated that such disposal would be part of a taxing and spending scheme. Id. at 2652 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). By contrast, in the ACA, the mandate that
individuals “shall” purchase insurance appeared “in the dispositive operative provision.” Id.
Hence, the New York case was inapposite.
201. Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2597–98 (Roberts, C.J.).
202. Id. at 2600.
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Finally, the majority ruled that the IM did not run afoul of the Article
I provision that “[n]o Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid,
unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before
directed.”203 According to the Court, the IM was not a “direct tax”—a
category that included only “head” taxes imposed on everyone and
those assessed against land or personal property.204 Nor was the IM
unusual, as Congress had previously taxed inactivity (as with head
taxes) and had used the Taxing Power to encourage Americans to buy
things (such as homes).205 Although the Chief Justice cautioned that this
power could not be exercised in such a manner as to impose a penalty
and could be used only to require a person to pay taxes, he concluded
that the IM did not exceed those limitations.206
b. The Dissent
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito argued that the IM
could only be plausibly construed as a Commerce Clause regulation
backed up by a “penalty” (an exaction as punishment for an unlawful
act), not as a “tax” (an enforced contribution to support the
government).207 These four Justices derided as “remarkable” the
majority’s position that the IM was not a tax under the AIA, but was a
tax under the Taxing Power.208 Similarly, the dissenters attacked the
Court’s assertion that, for constitutional purposes, the IM could be both
a “penalty” (in the Commerce Clause context) and a “tax” (pursuant to
the Taxing Clause), because all of the relevant cases had established
that these two terms were mutually exclusive.209 Most significantly, the
Court had never before held that a “penalty” for violation of the law was
so trivial that it could be dubbed a “tax.”210
The dissenting Justices concluded that the IM was “unquestionably”
a penalty, for four related reasons.211 First, Congress provided that every
covered individual “shall” (i.e., must) obtain “minimum essential
coverage” and that anyone who failed to meet this “requirement” would
suffer a “penalty.”212 Second, Congress’s findings repeatedly confirmed
that the IM set forth a “penalty” for the violation of a legal requirement
that flowed from the exercise of purely commercial regulatory (not
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 2598–99.
Id.
Id. at 2599.
Id. at 2599–600.
Id. at 2650–55 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 2656.
Id. at 2651.
Id.
Id. at 2652.
Id.
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taxing) power.213 Third, Congress consciously chose to treat the IM as a
“penalty” (a word repeated eighteen times in the ACA) rather than a
“tax.”214 Fourth, because Congress explicitly “imposed . . . a penalty”
for not purchasing insurance, such a failure was automatically
“unlawful” under longstanding precedent (contrary to the majority’s
claim that it was not).215 Indeed, the Court had “never . . . classified as a
tax an exaction imposed for violation of the law . . . [or] described in the
legislation itself as a penalty,” although some cases had treated as a tax
a required payment for something other than an unlawful act (such as a
“license” or “surcharge”).216
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito contrasted this
“mountain of evidence” that the IM was a regulatory “penalty” with the
Government’s “flimsiest of indications to the contrary.”217 For instance,
the Government emphasized that the IM penalty could be viewed as a
“tax” because it was assessed and collected by the IRS.218 The
dissenters demonstrated, however, that the IRS often enforced penalties,
and that the Court had routinely determined that such IRS collection did
not transform such “penalties” into “taxes.”219 Moreover, the IM was
also administered by the Department of Health & Human Services and
the Secretary of Veteran Affairs, which would be “quite extraordinary
for taxes.”220 Similarly, the dissenting Justices found misplaced the
Government’s reliance on the fact that the IM amount varied according
to income, because penalties are often adjusted based upon ability to
pay.221 Furthermore, the absence of a scienter requirement did not
suggest a tax, because the Government frequently imposed penalties for
acts or omissions without requiring proof of intent.222 Lastly, the
dissenters pointed out that the IM and related penalty were located in
Title I of the ACA (its operative core), rather than in Title IX (“Revenue
Provisions”), where a tax would be found.223
The foregoing analysis prompted the dissenting Justices to fault the
Court for confusing what Congress actually did in the IM (imposed a
213. Id.; see also id. at 2655 (noting that Congress had rejected an earlier version of
Obamacare “that imposed a tax instead of a requirement-with-penalty”).
214. Id. at 2653.
215. Id. at 2652.
216. Id. at 2653. The dissenters added that, if the IM were actually a “tax,” it would have
made no sense for Congress to exempt some individuals from that tax who were not exempt
from the mandate. Id.
217. Id. at 2654.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 2654–55.
223. Id. at 2655.
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penalty for violation of a regulatory law passed under the Commerce
Clause) with what Congress could have done (drafted a different statute
pursuant to the Taxing Power).224 The dissenters accused the majority of
“rewriting” rather than interpreting the statute.225
Because the dissenters rejected the conclusion that the IM had been
enacted as a tax, they did not have to “confront [the] difficult
constitutional question whether this is a direct tax that must be
apportioned among the States according to their population.”226 They
chided the majority for deciding that issue without the benefit of proper
briefing and argument.227
3. The Court’s Curious Approach to the Taxing Power
The critique of the majority opinion by Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito is devastating. Chief Justice Roberts cleverly
attempted to weaken its force by admitting that the dissenters presented
the most “natural” reading of the ACA and asserting that he merely had
to offer another construction that was “reasonable.”228 But the
possibility of plausible competing interpretations arises only where a
legal text is ambiguous. For instance, a statute or contract using the
word “Carolina” might sensibly refer to either North Carolina or South
Carolina. However, “Montana” could have but one meaning.
Likewise, the IM can reasonably be construed only as a regulatory
“penalty,” enacted under the Commerce Clause, designed to punish the
violation of the statutory requirement to purchase health care
insurance.229 That is exactly what the IM says,230 and the rest of the
ACA reinforces this clear meaning by referring to the IM as a “penalty”
eighteen times231 (and never as a “tax”).232 Obamacare’s legislative
history confirms this conclusion. The House and Senate rejected earlier
224. Id. at 2651.
225. Id. at 2655 (leveling this charge, and stressing that the judiciary, as the least
accountable branch, should never write tax legislation).
226. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 2593–94 (Roberts, C.J.).
229. See Jensen, supra note 175, at 98–110, 120; see also Ilya Shapiro, Like Eastwood
Talking to a Chair: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of the Obamacare Ruling, 17 TEX. REV. L.
& POL. 1, 11–12, 16 (2013) (arguing that the ACA was clear and that therefore it was incorrect
to invoke the canon of interpreting ambiguous statutes to avoid constitutional questions).
230. See ACA, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)–(b) (2012) (providing that every applicable
individual “shall” obtain “minimum essential coverage” and that those who “fail” to meet the
requirement” will be assessed “a penalty”).
231. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
232. See Jensen, supra note 175, at 106 (remarking that the word “tax” appeared in other
parts of the ACA, thereby suggesting that Congress referred to the IM as a “penalty” to convey a
different meaning); id. at 99, 102, 105–06 (noting that the IM penalty had no taxing or revenuerasing purpose, but simply supported the commercial regulatory scheme).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss6/8

34

Pushaw: The Paradox of the Obamacare Decision: How Can the Federal Govern

2013]

THE PARADOX OF THE OBAMACARE DECISION

2027

versions of the law that treated the IM as a tax under the Taxing
Power,233 undoubtedly because of the negative political consequences of
raising taxes. Instead, Congress deliberately chose to enact the mandate
as a “penalty” as part of a larger regulation of interstate commerce.234
Moreover, President Obama and his legislative supporters repeatedly
assured Americans that the IM was not a “tax.”235 The Court’s assertion
that the IM “penalty” is a “tax” is as misguided as construing
“Carolina” to mean “Montana.” Moreover, because the mandate is a
“penalty,” it cannot simultaneously be a “tax.”236 That is a legal
impossibility, like a jury rendering a verdict that both convicts and
acquits a defendant of a crime.
In an attempt to dodge this seemingly inescapable conclusion that
the IM is a “penalty,” the majority offered several arguments. The only
one that had a colorable legal basis was that the IM payment might be
deemed a “tax” because it was collected by the IRS and produced
revenue.237 Concededly, “taxes” have those two characteristics. But so
do “penalties.”238 Put differently, the fact that the IM “penalty” is
collected by the IRS and generates revenue does not turn it into a
“tax.”239
The majority’s other assertions are legally unsupportable. Perhaps
most dubious was Chief Justice Roberts’s claim that the IM was a
“penalty” for purposes of the AIA and Commerce Clause, but somehow
became a “tax” under the Taxing Power.240 The pertinent precedent
uniformly characterizes a government exaction as either a penalty or a
tax, and the Court has never interpreted a statutory provision expressly
imposing a “penalty” as a “tax.”241 Similarly counterintuitive was the
233. See Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 501 (2009);
America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009, S. 1796, 111th Cong. § 1301; see also Jensen, supra
note 175, at 97–98, 105–06 (emphasizing that the IM calls the charge a Apenalty,@ whereas
earlier bills referred to the mandate as an income or excise Atax@).
234. See supra notes 4, 19–20, 188, 207–25, 228–33 and accompanying text.
235. See Barnett, Commandeering, supra note 16, at 632–33; see also Karlan, supra note
23, at 45–47, 50 (acknowledging these assurances, but defending the IM under the Taxing
Power).
236. See supra notes 209–10 and accompanying text.
237. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.).
238. See supra notes 217–19 and accompanying text.
239. See Jensen, supra note 175, at 97, 102; see also Barnett, Commandeering, supra note
16, at 610–13 (arguing that (1) the IM “penalty” did not become a “tax” merely because
Congress inserted it into the Internal Revenue Code, and (2) the ACA and its legislative history
nowhere identified the purpose of the penalty as raising revenue). Ilya Shapiro makes a similar
point and adds that Chief Justice Roberts’s conclusion that the IM has no scienter requirement
contradicts his assertion that people can choose either to buy insurance or pay the tax, because a
“choice” by definition involves scienter. See Shapiro, supra note 229, at 13.
240. Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2593–94, 2597–98 (Roberts, C.J.).
241. See supra notes 209–10 and accompanying text. Dean Minow reconciles those
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majority’s denial that the failure to buy health insurance was
unlawful.242 Again, all relevant legal authority holds that, when a statute
imposes a “penalty” for an act or omission, such conduct is unlawful
per se.243
Of course, Chief Justice Roberts was correct in observing that the
label Congress attaches to an exaction—whether it be “tax,” “penalty,”
“fee,” or “license”—does not determine whether it was passed under the
Taxing Clause.244 Rather, the dispositive factor is Congress’s intent.
The IM’s language, considered in light of the ACA=s structure and
legislative history, plainly reveals that Congress intended the IM not to
be a “tax” but rather a “penalty” that implemented a Commerce Clause
regulation.245
In a nutshell, the IM “penalty” is not reasonably susceptible to being
construed as a “tax.” The Court reached the opposite conclusion by
disregarding the obvious meaning of the ACA, not to mention its own
case law.246 The Justices in the majority thereby left the impression that
they were prepared to dream up any reading of the IM that would enable
them to uphold it.
Such judicial legerdemain effectively grants Congress general police
powers. National Federation suggests that the Court can always find
that Congress implicitly relied upon the Taxing Clause to regulate
subjects that do not fall within any enumerated power and that have
always been left to the states. Political accountability under the
Constitution, however, demanded that the Court effectuate Congress’s
declared intent not to enact the IM as an exercise of its Taxing Power,
because the principal check on such power is the ability of citizens to
determine whether or not they support tax increases for particular
programs.247 Otherwise, as with Obamacare, Congress can promise
holdings as reflecting appropriate respect for Congress—deferring to its characterization of the
IM as a “penalty” in interpreting the AIA, but treating the IM as a “tax” in the ACA to sustain it
on constitutional grounds. See Minow, supra note 13, at 134. This argument might be persuasive
if the IM could reasonably be interpreted as a “tax” in the Obamacare statute, but it cannot be.
242. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2596–97 (Roberts, C.J.).
243. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 192–95 and accompanying text.
245. See Jensen, supra note 175, at 106–07.
246. See Reynolds & Denning, supra note 27, at 821 (decrying the majority’s strained
reading of precedent); Lawson, supra note 124, at 1712–13 (maintaining that Chief Justice
Roberts exceeded the scope of Article III “judicial power” and usurped Congress’s Article I
“legislative power” by rewriting the ACA and then purporting to uphold a statute that Congress
did not actually enact). Professor Magarian faults Chief Justice Roberts for failing to explain (1)
why he was reviving the pre-New Deal notion that the Taxing Clause does not authorize
Congress to impose “penalties,” instead of following the Court’s decades-long practice of
allowing as a “tax” any measure that raises revenue; and (2) how “taxes” can meaningfully be
distinguished from “penalties.” See Magarian, supra note 26, at 22–26.
247. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2655 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.,
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voters that its legislation does not impose taxes and hence avoid
political repercussions, but can remain confident that the Court years
later will alchemically transform the law into a tax.248
Finally, even assuming arguendo that the IM could reasonably be
deemed a “tax” as a matter of statutory interpretation, it is not entirely
clear that Congress has the constitutional power to enact such a tax. The
Taxing Clause has always been understood as authorizing Congress to
impose levies on the purchase of products (e.g., cigarettes and gasoline),
but not to require Americans to buy specific items.249 Moreover, this
Clause allows Congress to assess penalties only against those who fail
to meet their tax obligations, not those who violate other federal rules
(such as a mandate to obtain insurance).250 Perhaps most importantly,
the IM appeared to be a “direct” tax because it did not fall within any
other taxation category listed in the Constitution (duties, imposts,
excises, or income)—a logical inference that the majority did not
mention.251 As such, Article I required this direct tax to be apportioned
among the states based upon their population, whereas the IM was
not.252 More generally, an Article I tax cannot
attach to pure inactivity unrelated to earned or investment
income, or to the [citizen’s] person or the ownership of
property. The federal government has never taxed the
failure . . . to engage in a particular type of transaction, for
the simple reason that every person at any given time is not
engaged in thousands of activities that could expose him to
dissenting); Barnett, Commandeering, supra note 16, at 613–14, 633; see also Eastman, supra
note 22, at 19–20 (echoing this theme, and adding that the Constitution ensures political
accountability for imposing taxes primarily by requiring that tax bills originate in the House of
Representatives (whose members must face the voters every two years), whereas the Senate
introduced Obamacare and rammed it through by invoking the highly unusual procedural
mechanism of budget reconciliation).
248. Such a result cannot be justified as consistent with the Court=s practice of showing
extraordinary deference to Congress on tax matters, because the very reason for such deference
is that political accountability for raising taxes makes rigorous judicial review unnecessary. See
Barnett, Commandeering, supra note 16, at 610–14; Jensen, supra note 175, at 105–07; see also
supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text (describing such judicial deference and its
underlying rationale).
249. See Jensen, supra note 175, at 97–101, 120.
250. Id. at 103–04; see also supra note 177 and accompanying text.
251. See Eastman, supra note 22, at 20; Shapiro, supra note 229, at 17–18. Duties, imposts,
and excises are “indirect” taxes that must be assessed uniformly across the nation. See Jensen,
supra note 175, at 110. All other taxes are Adirect@ and must be apportioned by population,
except for those on income. Id. The IM is not a tax on income, even if it is filed with one=s tax
return, because the penalty for many people is not calculated based on their income. Id. at 117–
19.
252. See Barnett, No Small Feat, supra note 16, at 1340; Jensen, supra note 175, at 111–
20; Reynolds & Denning, supra note 27, at 821–22.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

37

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 6 [2013], Art. 8

2030

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

taxes from all sides.253
The Court’s cursory treatment of the “direct tax” issue, and its failure to
acknowledge the unprecedented nature of the IM “tax,” indicate that it
will continue to treat the Taxing Power as virtually plenary.
To be sure, Chief Justice Roberts did acknowledge one constitutional
limit: A “tax” cannot be so high as to be in reality a “penalty.”254 But he
declined to identify the amount of that tipping point, undoubtedly to
give Congress (and the Court) ample latitude in the future. That
opaqueness, along with his strained construction of the ACA and his
breezy treatment of serious constitutional taxing problems, provides
little hope that the Court will ever enforce any restrictions on
Congress’s ability to tax.255
4. Scholarly Defenses of the Majority Opinion: A Critical
Appraisal
Several distinguished professors have endorsed the Court’s holding
that the IM was a valid exercise of the Taxing Power.256 Most notably,
253. See Epstein, supra note 17, at 39; Shapiro, supra note 229, at 15–16 (similar). For an
opposing view, see Brian Galle, The Taxing Power, the Affordable Care Act, and the Limits of
Constitutional Compromise, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 407, 413–19 (2011) (arguing that (1) the
Framers included the deliberately vague phrase “direct tax” as part of a compromise over
slavery and expected it to be interpreted narrowly as not greatly limiting Congress’s power to
tax; (2) the IM is not a “direct” tax because it is not a head tax and can be avoided by buying
insurance; and (3) the IM can be considered as an “income” tax because those subject to it pay a
percentage of their income). Whatever the merits of the debate over direct taxes, the Court did
not give this issue the attention it deserved.
254. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2599–600 (2012).
255. Randy Barnett is more optimistic. He does lament that the Court undermined the
political constraints on the Taxing Power and allowed Congress to tax inactivity. Barnett, No
Small Feat, supra note 16, at 1340–41. Nonetheless, he asserts that Chief Justice Roberts did not
sustain Congress’s power to tax by imposing indirect economic mandates because Roberts
creatively interpreted the IM’s legal requirement to buy insurance as a mere option to do so or
pay a small penalty. Id. at 1337–38. However, Roberts cautioned that a higher amount (or the
threat of imprisonment) would be coercive and hence a forbidden “penalty,” which Barnett sees
as a meaningful limit on Congress’s constitutional power to tax. Id. at 1339. I will remain
skeptical until the Court actually strikes down a law.
256. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 24, at 85, 91–92 (approving this holding on the grounds
that (1) the Court had long recognized that the Taxing Power was remarkably broad, and (2) the
ACA mentioned the tax code, and the IM penalty was paid as part of an income tax return).
Indeed, some scholars had been making similar claims ever since the ACA was enacted. See,
e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Tax Power: The Little Argument That Could, CNN (June 30, 2012, 10:21
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/28/opinion/balkin-health-care (noting that he had been
contending for three years that the IM was a constitutional tax); Akhil Amar, Constitutional
Objections to Obamacare Don’t Hold Up, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2010),
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/20/opinion/la-oe-amar20-2010jan20 (defending the ACA
under the Taxing Clause); Galle, supra note 253, at 408–13 (pointing out that Congress need not
invoke the word Ataxes@ to exercise its constitutional power to tax, and that in any event the
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Robert Cooter and Neil Siegel praise Chief Justice Roberts for
distinguishing “taxes” from “penalties” based on practical
considerations such as the amount at stake and scienter requirements.257
Professors Cooter and Siegel argue that exactions often fall on a
spectrum.258 On one end, a “pure penalty” is coercive: It expresses
condemnation of the assessed conduct and effectively (1) prevents such
behavior by imposing a high cost relative to the expected gains from the
conduct; (2) increases the amount charged for intentional or repeated
infractions; and (3) raises little or no revenue.259 On the other end, a
“pure tax” (e.g., on income) permits action but dampens it and generates
significant revenue because the tax is less than the contemplated benefit
from the conduct.260 However, some exactions (like the IM) combine
aspects of a “penalty” and a “tax,” and they should be interpreted
according to their “effect” and “material characteristics”—not based on
labels used in the statute or congressional intent.261
Professors Cooter and Siegel conclude that, although the IM has the
expressive features of a “penalty” (by condemning the failure to
purchase health insurance), it has the effect and material characteristics
of a “tax” because it (1) noncoercively dampens but does not prevent
conduct (failing to buy insurance), since the amount of the exaction is
less than the gain realized by remaining uninsured; (2) raises substantial
revenue; and (3) contains no mens rea requirement and does not impose
a surcharge for intentional or repeated failures to purchase insurance.262
Cooter and Siegel’s original and creative thesis provides an
intellectual justification for sustaining the ACA under the Taxing
Clause, but is not firmly grounded in that Clause’s text, history, and
precedent. Most tellingly, these scholars cite no legal authority for their
proposed category of “mixed exactions.” On the contrary, the Court has
always treated an exaction as either a “tax” or a “penalty.”263
ACA often refers to Ataxes@). But see Barnett, Commandeering, supra note 16, at 607–09
(describing, but rejecting, the efforts of scholars and congressional staffers to portray the IM as
a “tax”).
257. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 1197–200, 1247–53. Initially, they maintain
that the Court has long struggled to differentiate a “tax” from a “regulation backed by a penalty”
and that the cases, while inconsistent, reveal that (1) this distinction cannot turn on whether an
exaction raises revenue or regulates behavior (because taxes and penalties both have this effect);
(2) the critical element of a “penalty” is its coercive nature; and (3) an exaction’s “material
characteristics” matter far more than the formal label attached to it. See id. at 1210–22.
258. See id. at 1198.
259. See id. at 1198–99, 1222–24, 1226, 1253.
260. See id. at 1198–99, 1222–24, 1226, 1252.
261. See id. at 1198–200, 1220–21, 1226–33, 1247–53.
262. See id. at 1198, 1226–28, 1236–53.
263. See supra notes 209–10, 216, 241 and accompanying text. Perhaps the Court’s “two
category” approach is simplistic and should be changed to include mixed exactions, but that
criticism does not alter the existing precedent.
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Furthermore, the Court has never held that a statutory “penalty” was
actually a “tax,”264 and it has invariably defined a “penalty” as a
punishment for violating a regulatory law.265 The IM precisely meets
that definition: The ACA manifested Congress’s unmistakable intent to
penalize individuals who violated its commercial regulatory legal
requirement to purchase health insurance.266 Professors Cooter and
Siegel seek to avoid this seemingly inevitable conclusion with three
pragmatic arguments.
First, they contend that interpretation of an exaction should focus not
on congressional intent, but rather on the exaction’s effects and material
characteristics.267 But the interpretation of any legal document is the
process of discerning and effectuating the intent of its drafters.268 Thus,
to ignore legislative intent is to rewrite a statute such as the ACA.
Second, Professors Cooter and Siegel claim that the IM does not
punish violation of the legal mandate to buy insurance, but rather
merely charges a fee to individuals who determine that ignoring this
requirement promotes their economic self-interest.269 This assertion,
which Chief Justice Roberts echoed,270 conceptualizes obeying the law
not as a moral duty but rather as a cold financial calculus.271 Not
surprisingly, before National Federation the Court had encouraged
respect for the law by uniformly construing statutes that imposed a
“penalty” for action (or inaction) as making such conduct “unlawful”
per se.272
Third, Cooter and Siegel acknowledge the concern that Congress
might escape political accountability by calling an exaction a “penalty”
in the political arena and a “tax” in court, but maintain that citizens are
aware that Congress often deceptively characterizes laws (especially
those involving taxes) and will hold it responsible when they believe
they are paying too much.273 Although this position might be realistic, it
is strange to urge the Court to pretend that an explicit “penalty” is a
264. See supra notes 210, 216 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 177, 207, 215 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 207, 211–16, 224–25, 229–36, 245 and accompanying text.
267. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 1198–200, 1222–36.
268. See Stanley Fish, There Is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629, 635
(2005).
269. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 1246–47.
270. See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text.
271. See Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 48–49 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing that the IM does not merely create financial incentives to buy
insurance but imposes a legal obligation to do so, and that courts should encourage people’s
desire to be law-abiding and not assume that they are driven solely by economic motives). But
see Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 1246–47 (rejecting Judge Kavanaugh’s position).
272. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
273. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 1243–45.
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“tax” because people know that Congress lies about tax legislation.274
Overall, Professors Cooter and Siegel rely more on Realpolitik and
economics than law. Their approach has little foundation in either the
original meaning of the Taxing Clause or its implementing precedent.
Finally, the implicit embrace of their theory in National Federation
enabled the Court to transform a “penalty” into a “tax” and thereby
uphold a huge federal government program that took over matters
formerly left to the states and private parties, a result that further
eviscerated the Federalism Principle.275
5. Conclusion
The National Federation opinion and its scholarly defenses
ultimately rest on the premise that the Taxing Power is extraordinarily
broad. That proposition, however, establishes only that Congress
perhaps could have imposed the IM as a “tax” pursuant to the Taxing
Clause. But Congress chose not to do so and instead enacted the IM as a
“penalty” under the Commerce Clause.276 This legislative decision was
deliberate and substantive, not a careless or technical labeling of the
exaction. The Court should have honored Congress’s intent and ruled
that the IM did not involve an exercise of the Taxing Power.
C. The Spending Power
Between 1937 and 2011, the Court rubber-stamped every statute
passed under the Taxing and Spending Clauses, which created the
274. Professors Cooter and Siegel recognize that courts should defer to Congress if it
expressly disclaims use of the Taxing Power, but contend that such a disclaimer should not be
inferred from Congress’s mere failure to specifically invoke this power or its use of the word
“penalty” rather than “tax” (as in the ACA). See id. at 1228 & n.160. By contrast, I conclude
that the ACA’s language and legislative history demonstrate that Congress clearly disavowed
any reliance on the Taxing Clause, and that the Court should have given effect to that choice.
See supra notes 229–36, 245–48 and accompanying text.
275. These two scholars make the counterintuitive assertion that their approach helps
preserve federalism. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 1245 n.222, 1253 n.256. They do
not, however, explain how National Federation and Congress’s exercise of unchecked Taxing
Power since 1936 have protected the traditional reserved powers of the states. Instead, they
simply reference their earlier work. See id. at 1200 n.16 (citing Robert D. Cooter & Neil S.
Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV.
115 (2010) (arguing that Article I authorizes Congress to tax, spend, and regulate to solve
“collective action” problems created by interstate externalities and national markets, which
states acting individually cannot effectively address)); Galle, supra note 253, at 411–12
(contending that federal taxation of health care increases state autonomy by addressing Afree
rider@ problems). I have elsewhere explained why this approach cannot be reconciled with the
Constitution’s basic Federalism Principle: that the federal government is limited to its
enumerated powers and that all other powers are entrusted to the states. See Pushaw, supra note
94, at 1716–18, 1721–30, 1742–43, 1754.
276. See supra notes 207, 211–16, 224, 229–36, 245 and accompanying text.
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impression that the two powers were inextricably linked and equally
absolute. Therefore, it came as a surprise when all of the Justices
(except Ginsburg and Sotomayor) concluded that the ACA had
exceeded Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause.277 A brief
legal background will help to place this holding in context.
1. Spending Clause Doctrine
Congress can tax “to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defense and general Welfare of the United States.”278 The “general
Welfare” originally referred to the provision of “public goods” (i.e.,
those that must be made available to everyone, like roads), but did not
include direct transfer payments from one group of citizens to
another.279 The main historical debate was whether “general Welfare”
encompassed only those subjects listed in Article I (Madison’s view) or
was a distinct grant of substantive power (Hamilton’s position).280 In
1936, the Court adopted Hamilton’s broad construction in United States
v. Butler,281 yet struck down the Agricultural Adjustment Act on the
ground that it did not promote the general welfare but rather reached the
“local” matter of agriculture, which the Tenth Amendment reserved to
the states.282
The next year, in companion cases upholding the Social Security Act
(SSA), the Court affirmed the Hamiltonian vision, but retreated from
imposing federalism-based limits.283 The Court announced that
Congress’s discretionary determinations about how to provide for the
general welfare in light of changing circumstances would be sustained
unless “clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, [or] not an exercise
of judgment.”284 The Court acknowledged that monetary “inducements”
to the states might at some point rise to the level of unconstitutional
“duress,” but found that the SSA did not cross that line.285
Neither did any other federal law. Most significantly, the Court
routinely upheld Congress’s power to expressly condition states’ receipt
of funds on their compliance with federal directives—even in areas
where Congress had no power to regulate directly, and the subject had
277. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601–08 (2012) (Roberts,
C.J.); accord id. at 2656–67 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
278. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
279. See Epstein, supra note 17, at 30–32.
280. See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 5–6, 19–20, 27–31
(1994).
281. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
282. Id. at 65–66, 74–75, 78.
283. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S.
619 (1937).
284. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640.
285. See Steward, 301 U.S. at 585–86, 590.
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previously been entrusted to the states.286
In the leading case of South Dakota v. Dole,287 the Court sustained a
statute that withheld five percent of states’ federal highway funding if
they did not raise their minimum drinking age to 21, even though the
Twenty-first Amendment prohibits Congress from regulating alcohol.288
The Court concluded that this law met five requirements for Spending
Clause legislation. First, Congress had acted for the “general welfare”:
providing a national solution to the interstate highway problems caused
by states having different drinking ages.289 Second, the statute gave
clear notice to the states that raising this age was a condition of
receiving full federal highway funding, thereby ensuring that they
voluntarily consented to the federal government’s proposed contract
terms.290 Third, and relatedly, Congress had “encouraged” rather than
“coerced” states because five percent was a relatively small amount.291
Fourth, Congress’s conditions did not induce states to violate their
citizens’ constitutional rights.292 Fifth, the condition (raising the
drinking age) related to the federal interest in the spending program
(promoting safe interstate highway travel).293
The Dole “limits,” however, proved to be more rhetorical than real.
Indeed, the Court rejected every challenge to Congress’s exercise of its
Spending Power—until National Federation.
2. The National Federation Opinions
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan and by
286. See Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947). In Pennhurst
State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), the Court acknowledged that
Congress had power to fund state programs for the developmentally disabled. Id. at 15–16.
Nonetheless, the Court held that, at the time Congress had first offered such funding, it had
failed to unambiguously notify the states about a particular condition that it later tried to impose
(requiring states to implement a “patients’ bill of rights”). Id. at 17–25.
287. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
288. Id. at 206–12.
289. Id. at 207–08.
290. See id. But see Epstein, supra note 104, at 954 (protesting that “[i]t hardly answers a
[constitutional] challenge to congressional overreach for Congress to have made its illegal
intention known clearly”).
291. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211–12.
292. Id. at 208–11.
293. Id. at 207–09. But see Epstein, supra note 104, at 954 (observing that the issue should
not have been whether Congress’s condition related to its grant, but rather whether the federal
government could help determine drinking ages); Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman,
Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon its Spending Doctrine, and How a TooClever Congress Could Provoke it to do so, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 512–17, 522 (2003) (criticizing
this “relatedness” factor as vague and capable of being applied with varying degrees of
stringency).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

43

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 6 [2013], Art. 8

2036

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

the other four Republican Justices in their separate opinion, concluded
that Congress had overstepped its boundaries under the Spending
Clause by coercing states to adopt the Medicaid expansion (and all its
conditions) through the threat of withholding all of their Medicaid
funding (not merely the new money earmarked for Obamacare).294 The
Court stressed that, because Medicaid spending consumed over twenty
percent of the average state’s budget and billions of dollars annually,
states had no legitimate choice as to whether they would voluntarily
accept federal funds and the attached conditions—unlike in cases such
as Dole, which involved a small percentage and amount of funding.295
The Court acknowledged that Congress in the original Medicaid Act
reserved the right to “alter” or “amend” its provisions.296 Nonetheless,
the ACA made such a radical change—requiring states not merely to
add a discrete category of covered individuals (such as the blind) but to
care for millions of low-income people—that it was actually an entirely
new program that the states could not possibly have anticipated.297
The Court warned that allowing Congress to compel the states to do
its bidding would destroy state autonomy, threaten political
accountability (because voters would not know whether to hold the
federal or state governments responsible), and infringe upon individual
liberty.298 To buttress this point, the Court invoked two cases from the
1990s holding that Congress could not “commandeer” state legislatures
or executives to enact or implement laws.299
Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justice Sotomayor) disputed the
majority’s four main arguments.300 First, the Medicaid expansion was
not a new program, but a mere addition to an existing statutory scheme
set up to help the poor to obtain health care.301 Second, when the states
first agreed to cooperate with Medicaid, they were on notice that the
294. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601–07 (2012) (Roberts,
C.J.); accord id. at 2643, 2661–68 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
295. Id. at 2602–04 (Roberts, C.J.); accord id. at 2659–66 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito, JJ., dissenting).
296. Id. at 2605–06 (Roberts, C.J.).
297. Id. at 2601–02, 2605–06 (Roberts, C.J.); see also id. at 2605 (describing the new ACA
requirement as “a shift in kind, not merely degree”). The other four Republican Justices agreed.
See id. at 2657, 2662–64 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
298. Id. at 2602 (Roberts, C.J.); accord id. at 2659–60, 2676–77 (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
299. Id. at 2602–03 (Roberts, C.J.) (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933
(1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992)); accord id. at 2660 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (citing Printz, 521 U.S. at 930; New York, 505
U.S. at 161–62, 168–69, 182–83).
300. Id. at 2629–42 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
301. See id. at 2630–32, 2635–36; see also id. at 2630–31, 2635 (noting that Congress had
previously expanded Medicaid several times and imposed high costs on the states, whereas the
federal government would pick up most of the tab for the ACA).
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statute could be amended and that coverage might be increased.302
Third, the ACA was not unduly coercive, but rather was a typical
exercise of the Spending Power whereby states would receive funds if
they complied with reasonable conditions set by Congress.303 Fourth,
courts should treat “coercion” as a political question because it was
impossible for them to determine whether states had a legitimate choice
regarding funding.304
Indeed, Justice Ginsburg apparently believes that all of Congress’s
judgments under the Spending Clause are not justiciable, because she
failed to identify anything that might lie beyond this power. That candid
embrace of unbridled federal authority probably explains why only one
of her colleagues joined her opinion.
Turning to the remedy, Chief Justice Roberts allied with Justices
Breyer and Kagan in ruling that Congress (1) could not withdraw
existing funds from states that decline to comply with the ACA’s
Medicaid expansion, but could offer new funds and condition their
acceptance on the states’ voluntary compliance with the new ACA
regulations; and (2) intended for the Court to preserve the rest of the
ACA if one provision were deemed unconstitutional.305 Justices
Ginsburg and Sotomayor agreed that Congress could offer the states
new money to induce them to conform to the Medicaid expansion and
that the invalidated provision could be severed from the rest of the
statute.306 By contrast, the other four Justices would have struck down
the entire ACA because the Medicaid expansion and the IM were so
integral to the statute that it could not possibly work as Congress
intended if either provision were invalidated.307
In sum, seven Justices concluded that Congress had run afoul of the
Spending Clause by coercing the states.308 This rare supermajority
consensus broke down, however, in the remedial stage.
302. See id. at 2630, 2636–39; see also id. at 2636–38 (arguing that precedent established
that Congress must make its conditions clear at the time it offers the states funds, not when the
original law creating a regulatory program was passed).
303. See id. at 2630, 2633, 2639–41; see also id. at 2634 (maintaining that, unlike in Dole,
the ACA did not offer federal money to induce states to take action that Congress itself could
not directly perform (raise the drinking age), because Congress obviously can regulate health
care).
304. See id. at 2640–41.
305. Id. at 2607–08 (Roberts, C.J.). Unfortunately, Roberts=s decision to excise the ACA’s
funding penalty from the Medicaid expansion freed states to refuse to participate, thereby
undermining the statute’s purpose. See Magarian, supra note 26, at 32.
306. Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2630–31, 2641–42 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
307. Id. at 2667–77 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
308. Id. at 2601–08 (Roberts, C.J.); accord id. at 2643, 2656–68 (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
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3. The Court’s Long-Overdue Imposition of Limits Under the
Spending Clause
For seventy-five years, judicial review of Spending Clause
legislation had resulted in upholding every statute. In the real world, it
would have made no difference if the Court had simply treated the
Clause as raising political questions (as Justice Ginsburg suggested309).
Thus, striking down an exercise of the Spending Power was a big
departure from established practice, and is especially noteworthy
because it garnered the votes of seven (not merely five) Justices.310
Nonetheless, it is not clear whether National Federation is a once-acentury ruling or the beginning of a trend towards restraining
Congress.311
If the latter, any serious attempt at imposing such limits would
require the Court to set forth intelligible legal rules instead of the vague
standards it provided.312 Most notably, the majority expressly refused to
identify the dollar amount or percentage of federal funds that Congress
would have to withhold to support a finding of “coercion” rather than
mere “inducement.”313 Dole allowed a five percent reduction amounting
to a few million dollars, whereas National Federation rejected a denial
of all federal funding to the tune of billions of dollars.314 Most federal
statutes fall between those extremes, and the Court will have to sort
them out on a case-by-case basis by making increasingly fine
distinctions that have little legal or logical basis.315
309. See id. at 2640–41 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
310. See Reynolds & Denning, supra note 27, at 829.
311. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 137, at 901 (predicting that the case will merely set “an
extreme outer limit” on the Spending Power, and will not begin a serious rollback); Samuel R.
Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J.
861, 864–67, 870–71, 898, 910 (2013) (contending that National Federation will be read
narrowly as finding unconstitutional “coercion” only when a spending condition (1) involves
large amounts of federal money, (2) changes the terms of participating in entrenched
cooperative programs, and (3) prevents states from continuing in such schemes unless they also
agree to participate in a separate and independent program).
312. See Epstein, supra note 104, at 954 (decrying the “mushy factors” used in Spending
Power analysis).
313. Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (Roberts, C.J.) (declaring that the Court need not “fix a
line” where congressional persuasion actually turns into compulsion); see also Bagenstos, supra
note 311, at 901 (highlighting the “line-drawing problem of identifying just when an offer of
funds became large enough to become coercive”); Baker & Berman, supra note 293, at 485,
518–21, 532–33 (faulting the Court for failing to identify an objective basis for determining
when the pressure of any given federal offer becomes so great as to amount to “coercion”).
314. See supra notes 294–95 and accompanying text.
315. See Magarian, supra note 26, at 29–30 (emphasizing that the Court’s refusal to define
“coercion” left Congress and lower federal courts with no guidance in determining the
constitutionality of spending conditions). “Coercion is notoriously difficult to identify, in large
part because no agreement exists on the proper baseline against which to assess if a state
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Moreover, the Court conflated “coercion” under the Spending
Clause with Congress’s “commandeering” of states—i.e., directly
ordering them to enact or execute laws, with no funding incentives.316
Although both “coercion” and “commandeering” threaten state
autonomy, the latter seems uniquely destructive of federalism because
Congress simply orders states to obey its commands.317 Furthermore,
the Court’s point that “coercion” undermines political accountability,
while correct, cannot be reconciled with its ruling that permits Congress
to evade political responsibility for increasing taxes by deeming an
exaction a regulatory “penalty” and trusting the Court to uphold it later
as a “tax.”318
Indefiniteness also characterizes two other aspects of the National
Federation decision. First, the Court neglected to explain how it could
tell when a purported statutory “amendment” was so significant as to
be, in reality, a new law.319 In any event, if Congress has power under
the Spending Clause, it should not matter constitutionally whether that
power is exercised through amending an existing statute or enacting a
new one.320 Second, it seems inherently subjective to try to determine
whether Congress’s notice to states in its original legislation of its
prerogative to make amendments (as in the 1965 Medicaid law) will
sufficiently enable states to anticipate future changes in coverage.321
In short, the Court has failed to provide concrete guidance to
Congress or judges. Instead, they must make ad hoc gut calls as to
whether a statutory provision (1) “induces” or “coerces” the states,
(2) is a mere “amendment” or a new program, or (3) could have been

funding condition goes too far.” Metzger, supra note 24, at 99.
316. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2602–03 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2660 (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
317. Cf. Epstein, supra note 104, at 955 (recognizing the formal distinction between
Congress’s direct “commandeering” of states and its conditional use of the Spending Power, but
arguing that in both instances the federalism concerns are the same). See generally Lynn A.
Baker, Constitutional Ambiguities and Originalism: Lessons from the Spending Power, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 495, 519–42 (2009) (demonstrating that the Court’s pre-National Federation
approval of plenary Spending Power resulted in systematic wealth redistribution from largepopulation states to smaller ones, thereby infringing on the autonomy of the more populous
states).
318. See supra notes 229–48, 273–74 and accompanying text.
319. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2635–36 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
320. See id. at 2629, 2636; see also Magarian, supra note 26, at 28 (arguing that the
bifurcation between the “existing” and “new” Medicaid programs had “no basis in law or
logic”); Metzger, supra note 24, at 96 (questioning any “firm distinction between the old and
new Medicaid and between inducement and coercion”).
321. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2637–39 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part); Bagenstos, supra note 311, at 903.
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foreseen by the states.322 Such elastic standards under the Spending
Clause (as under the Commerce Clause) create discretion so broad that
political and ideological factors will heavily influence legal judgment.
Therefore, the Court should make a more fundamental change by
adopting a rules-based approach.
Ideally, the Court would abandon “coercion” as its analytical
touchstone because Congress’s conditional grants to states are almost
always coercive. The reason is that no rational elected official will
decline her state’s fair share of federal taxpayer-provided funds, then
make up the difference by increasing state taxes to get exactly the same
benefit.323 Because such double taxation is political suicide, states will
invariably follow Congress’s wishes. Thus, the issue is always the
degree of coercion, not the false dichotomy between “encouragement”
and “coercion.”
Realistically, however, the Court is unlikely to abandon a test it has
followed for nearly eight decades. Accordingly, a second-best solution
would be to set forth precise numerical amounts, in terms of both
percentage and dollars of funds withheld, that Congress cannot exceed
without being found to have “coerced” the states.324
Finally, Congress should never be permitted to invoke the Spending
Clause to achieve indirectly what it lacks Article I power to do directly.
That is especially true when, as in Dole, a specific constitutional
provision prohibits the federal government from interfering with state
control of a subject.325
National Federation, then, warrants cautious optimism. On the one

322. See Metzger, supra note 24, at 99–102, 115–16 (proposing as an alternative serious
judicial review of administrative determinations that state funds should be terminated, including
reversal of decisions that do not sufficiently consider federalism concerns).
323. See Epstein, supra note 104, at 956. Of course, a state might simply forgo the
proffered federal benefit (and attached funds) and conclude that the benefit is not worth the cost
of imposing a state tax.
324. Professor Berman has rejected the idea of basing unconstitutionality on the amount of
funds states stand to lose. Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid
Expansion: A Study in the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283, 1286,
1295–96 (2013). Instead, he contends that the Court, in National Federation and other
decisions, has incorrectly assumed that “coercion” means compulsion—i.e., that states had no
rational choice but to accept Congress’s conditions. Id. at 1285, 1287, 1289–303, 1346. Berman
would define “coercion” more precisely to refer to a situation in which Congress threatens to
withhold a benefit for the bad purpose of penalizing states for exercising their constitutional
right to decline the offer of federal funds. Id. at 1286–88, 1308–14, 1343, 1347. Under this
framework, the Medicaid expansion was coercive because it penalized states for asserting their
constitutional prerogative to refuse federal money. Id. at 1280, 1315–40, 1347. Although
Professor Berman and I set forth different proposals, we agree that the Court’s current
“coercion” standard must be given more concrete content.
325. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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hand, the Court has finally enforced limits on the Spending Clause.326
On the other hand, no one quite knows what those restrictions are. The
Court will try to work out such details in future cases, but such a
common law approach has failed in many other areas of constitutional
law.327
II. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF
NATIONAL FEDERATION
National Federation contains the most substantial rethinking of
Congress’s powers since the New Deal, and the decision could have a
profound impact. Whether it is actually a harbinger of such change,
however, depends primarily on whether Republican Justices remain in
the majority.328 If they do, constitutional jurisprudence might well be
transformed in three key areas.
First, the Court for the first time since 1936 held that a major federal
statute had exceeded Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce:
The ACA illegitimately imposed a purchase mandate on individuals
who were not currently engaged in commercial “activity.”329 National
Federation might presage further restrictions on the Commerce Clause.
Second, the five conservatives held that, even if Congress had
concluded that a specific means (such as the IM) was “necessary” to
implement its legislative program, such a mechanism was not “proper”
if it undermined the Constitution’s structure of federalism.330 This
rejection of a statutory provision as “improper,” however, departed from
the Court’s longstanding tradition of accepting Congress’s discretionary
choice of any means that were reasonably related to achieving an
Article I end (an easy test that virtually all statutes met).331 Such
deference extended to Congress’s judgments about federalism.332
326. See Metzger, supra note 24, at 86 (suggesting that Chief Justice Roberts’s
endorsement of Congress’s broad power to tax led him to constrain the Spending Clause,
because otherwise the federal government’s huge financial resources would effectively grant it
unbridled authority).
327. See Pushaw, supra note 34, at 520–29, 577–91 (providing numerous illustrations of
such failures).
328. See Barnett, No Small Feat, supra note 16, at 1341 (“Of course a change in the
Justices could negate the importance of the [National Federation] decision, but that could
happen with any doctrine.”).
329. See supra Subsection I.A.2.
330. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 90–92, 119–21, 127–29 and accompanying text.
332. To take the most famous example, the Marshall Court upheld the Bank of the United
States as a necessary and proper means of implementing various Article I powers (e.g., taxation,
borrowing, and regulating commerce), even though states (echoing Madison and Jefferson)
protested that doing so destroyed the Constitution’s federal–state balance. See McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406–15 (1819), discussed supra notes 119–121 and
accompanying text.
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Because the Court’s basic “substantial effects” test depends upon the
Necessary and Proper Clause,333 National Federation may portend
similarly aggressive judicial review of other federal regulatory laws.
Third, the Court abruptly reversed seventy-five years of practice by
invalidating Spending Clause legislation.334 This ruling might trigger
considerable litigation which previously would have seemed quixotic.
Again, however, none of these potentially radical changes will occur
if one Republican Justice is replaced by a Democrat. Indeed, even if the
current majority remains intact, National Federation may not have
much lasting force.335 The main reason is that the ACA is the only
federal statute ever passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause that
imposed an individual mandate to buy certain products.336 Congress
may never employ this device again, which would make National
Federation a one-shot curiosity.337 Moreover, the Court will probably
prove reluctant to second-guess Congress’s determinations about
whether a law is “necessary and proper” to achieve a desired legislative
goal, as such judgments are usually subjective and policy-laden.338 It is
also worth emphasizing that Obamacare presented an extreme situation
under the Spending Power where Congress threatened non-complying
states with a cutoff of all federal money running into billions of
dollars.339 Less draconian reductions in funding will likely prompt
correspondingly more deferential judicial review.
Of course, the biggest doubts about the Court’s willingness to
restrain Congress arise because Chief Justice Roberts joined the liberal
Justices in refusing to curb the Taxing Power, which had the practical
effect of negating the limiting constructions that he and his fellow
Republicans had placed on the Commerce and Necessary and Proper
Clauses.340 Congress apparently can now pass any law it wishes and
333. See supra notes 41–51, 89–90, 118–21 and accompanying text.
334. See supra Section I.C.
335. See Metzger, supra note 24, at 113 (predicting that the case “will not be a foretaste of
a newly retrenched federal government, but instead at most a crimping at the edges”).
336. See supra notes 7, 71–76, 95–99, 107–09, 135, 160 and accompanying text.
337. Randy Barnett recognizes, but downplays, this argument. See Barnett, No Small Feat,
supra note 16, at 1342. Practically speaking, however, the prevalence of a particular type of
statutory provision is quite relevant in gauging the impact of a case that interprets such a
provision.
338. See supra notes 90–91, 120–21, 127–29 and accompanying text.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 294–95, 314.
340. See supra notes 17, 137–38 and accompanying text. Professor Barnett rejects this
contention on the ground that Roberts did recognize a limit on the Taxing Power—that it could
not be exercised to coerce rather than incentivize—which will be enforced in future cases.
Barnett, No Small Feat, supra note 16, at 1337–40. This faith in the Chief Justice’s willingness
to invalidate a federal tax law seems misplaced, however, as he could easily have done so in
National Federation but instead chose to save the IM through creative statutory and
constitutional interpretation. See supra Subsection I.B.2.a.
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trust the Court to uphold it as a valid tax.341 Therefore, the only
remaining restraint is that the money raised by taxes cannot be spent in
a way that “coerces” states, but the Court may not be inclined to stretch
its National Federation “coercion” holding beyond the unique facts of
that case.342
Most importantly from a jurisprudential standpoint, the Court’s
reaffirmation of seemingly absolute federal taxing authority cannot be
squared with its repeated endorsement of the Federalism Principle: the
classic idea that the Constitution limits the federal government to its
enumerated powers and reserves all others to the states or “the People”
collectively.343 To be fair, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito
were perfectly consistent: They argued that the Federalism Principle
demanded that the ACA be struck down because it went beyond
Congress’s powers under the Commerce, Necessary and Proper, Taxing,
and Spending Clauses—and concomitantly invaded the states’ reserved
power.344 Conversely, Justice Ginsburg showed equal and opposite
consistency: She championed a nationalistic vision of federalism, urging
judicial deference to Congress’s resolution of any problem that it deems
to be of national interest and beyond the capacity of states to address.345
By contrast, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion presented a schizophrenic
view.
On the one hand, he rhetorically agreed with his fellow Republican
Justices’ embrace of the traditional Federalism Principle. For example,
the Chief Justice began by laying out the historical consensus that the
Constitution’s design—committing all powers to the states except for
those specifically granted to the federal government—promoted
accountability and preserved individual liberty.346 He also declared that
the Court’s “respect for Congress’s policy judgments thus can never
extend so far as to disavow restraints on federal power that the
Constitution carefully constructed.”347 Discharging this duty to exercise
serious judicial review to protect federalism, Chief Justice Roberts
relied heavily upon the Founders’ understanding in rejecting Congress’s
341. See supra notes 246–48, 255 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 11, 294–99, 311 and accompanying text; see also John Yoo, Chief
ST.
J.
(June
29,
Justice
Roberts
and
his
Apologists,
WALL
2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303561504577496520011395292
(arguing that the Court will likely sustain less extreme exercises of the Spending Power, and that
any limits imposed under the Commerce and Spending Clauses were undercut by the Court=s
expansive reading of the Taxing Power).
343. See supra notes 14–20 and accompanying text.
344. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2642–77 (2012) (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
345. Id. at 2609–12, 2614–15 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
346. Id. at 2577–78 (Roberts, C.J.).
347. Id. at 2579.
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attempts to (1) impose the IM as a regulation of interstate commerce,348
(2) invoke the Necessary and Proper Clause as an end-run to achieve the
same result,349 and (3) use the Spending Power to coerce the states.350
On the other hand, the Chief Justice did not mention limited and
enumerated federal powers or federalism in upholding the IM under the
Taxing Clause.351 This silence speaks volumes. Every time the Court
permits Congress to assume control over subjects formerly entrusted to
the states, the Tenth Amendment and its underlying values are eroded.
For purposes of the Federalism Principle, the only relevant fact is that
power has been transferred from the states to the federal government; it
does not matter which Article I power effectuates this shift. Likewise,
the political reality is that Congress and the President (and the American
people) cared only that Obamacare was sustained; only lawyers and
scholars worried about the details.
But those details are the raison d’etre of the Justices, who have a
duty to provide legally cogent rationales for their decisions.
Unfortunately, Chief Justice Roberts failed to coherently explain how
constitutional federalism would be preserved by restricting Congress
under the Commerce, Necessary and Proper, and Spending Clauses, yet
allowing Congress to reach its desired result under the Taxing Power.352
Instead of invalidating the ACA and invigorating the Federalism
348. Id. at 2586–87 (contending that the Framers’ use of “regulate” in the Commerce
Clause presupposed existing commercial activity); id. at 2589 (quoting Madison’s statements
that all federal government powers, including the Commerce Clause, had limits).
349. Id. at 2591–92 (citing Madison, Hamilton, and Marshall to justify imposing
restrictions on Congress’s authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause).
350. Id. at 2602–03, 2608 (asserting that the Founders did not intend for Spending Clause
legislation to undermine state autonomy or individual liberty). Overall, Chief Justice Roberts
and his four Republican colleagues kept alive the idea of judicially enforced federalism in their
discussions of the Commerce, Necessary and Proper, and Spending Clauses. Compare Reynolds
& Denning, supra note 27, at 828–31 (applauding this preservation), with Magarian, supra note
26, at 32 (decrying the conservative Justices for activism in imposing new federalism-based
restrictions on federal power).
351. His only nod to early history was quoting Benjamin Franklin’s quip that nothing is
certain “except death and taxes.” Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2599. Professor Karlan notes that
Roberts’s worries that Congress might abuse its powers, which pervaded his Commerce Clause
analysis, disappeared when he turned to the tax issue, probably because he believed that the
political process would prevent confiscatory taxation. See Karlan, supra note 23, at 50–51.
352. See Reynolds & Denning, supra note 27, at 814–15 (stressing that Roberts=s broad
reading of the Taxing Clause eroded the principle of limited government). Professor Barnett
acknowledges the possibility that the Court will always uphold a major federal statute by any
means necessary, as Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion illustrates. Barnett, No Small Feat, supra
note 16, at 1341. Nonetheless, he believes that the federalism-based doctrinal limitations
articulated in National Federation will have practical future relevance. Id. at 1332–37, 1341–43,
1349–50. But if the Court could not even logically apply these federalism restrictions in the very
case in which they were announced by striking down the IM, there is no reason to suppose that a
majority of Justices will do so in the future.
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Principle, the Chief Justice hammered another nail in its coffin. The
Constitution’s original federalist design suffered a near-fatal blow in
1937, when the Court discarded this structure (and its related protection
of economic rights) and substituted the idea that only a centralized,
Parliament-style government could effectively regulate the economy
and social welfare.353 The Court then ignored the Federalism Principle
for decades in approving massive federal regulation in areas like crime,
poverty programs, and the environment.354 The Rehnquist Court took a
few baby steps toward imposing some outer limits on Congress in
Lopez, Morrison, and the “commandeering” cases, but even those slight
gains appeared to recede in Raich.355
The upshot is that the Court in National Federation wasted a oncein-a-generation opportunity to render a landmark decision that would
have given new life to the Federalism Principle.356 Instead, the Court
sent out mixed signals that increased uncertainty about the scope of
Congress’s powers.357
III. NATIONAL FEDERATION’S EFFECT ON THE REPUTATION OF
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS AND HIS COURT
Why did Chief Justice Roberts switch sides at the eleventh hour to
uphold the ACA?358 How Americans answer that question will affect
the reputation of both Roberts and the Court. Commentators have
suggested a range of possibilities.
The most disturbing is that the Chief Justice succumbed to public
pressure from President Obama and his allies in Congress, the media,
and academia—all of whom had been darkly warning the five
Republican Justices not to reach the seemingly partisan result of striking
353. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist
Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 399, 455–57 (1996) (describing this seismic shift).
354. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 38, at 83–88 (citing cases).
355. See supra notes 52–69 and accompanying text.
356. See Metzger, supra note 24, at 87 (arguing that National Federation’s net result might
be “a change in the form of federal measures, but little restriction on the scope of federal power”
(emphasis added)).
357. Professor Karlan claims that the conservative majority seeks to reverse or limit core
Warren Court cases upholding Great Society and civil rights legislation. See Karlan, supra note
23, at 11. But the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts have routinely applied these decisions
(such as Katzenbach and Heart of Atlanta Motel) without ever questioning them. See supra
notes 50–51 and accompanying text. Indeed, since 1937 exactly zero Commerce, Taxing, and
Spending Clause cases have been overruled.
Thus, I agree with Randy Barnett that the five conservative Republican Justices have likely
adopted a compromise approach by accepting the New Deal and Warren Court precedent as a
fait accompli, but insisting that Congress justify the assertion of any new powers with a
constitutional theory that does not destroy the enumerated powers scheme and federalism. See
Barnett, No Small Feat, supra note 16, at 1348–50.
358. See supra notes 21–27 and accompanying text.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

53

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 6 [2013], Art. 8

2046

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

down a Democratic President’s signature legislation in an election
year.359 That accusation can never be proven, and it is inconsistent with
Chief Justice Roberts’s refusal to bend in other politically charged
constitutional cases.360 Nonetheless, the Democrats’ concerted effort to
sway the Justices—and the popular perception that this strategy
worked—have damaged the Court’s credibility.361
A more flattering scenario is that the Chief Justice acted in a
statesmanlike way to preserve the Court’s stature as an institution ruled
by law, since citizens would recognize that the result did not reflect his
conservative political views and hence must have been based on
constitutional principles.362 A related idea is that Americans would see
deference to Congress and the President as an appropriate exercise of
judicial restraint that would leave the ultimate fate of Obamacare to the
democratic process established in the Constitution.363 Alas, the belief
that the Court could have remained above the political fray was
misguided, as most Americans concluded that politics played a major
role in the National Federation decision.364 Relatedly, any attempt by
Chief Justice Roberts to avoid the appearance of a politicized decision
backfired when his vote switch became public.365
Indeed, even some scholars who supported the result in National
Federation conceded that, in light of the obvious weaknesses of Chief
Justice Roberts’s legal analysis, he must have been driven primarily by
a desire to protect the Court as an institution.366 But nakedly striving to
359. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
360. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 588 U.S. 310 (2010) (ruling that
the First Amendment prohibits the federal government from restricting political contributions by
corporations and unions). President Obama publicly urged the Court to sustain the campaign
finance reform law and lambasted Citizens United in his January 2010 State of the Union
address, and he has continued to chastise Republicans on this issue. See Jackie Calmes & Carl
Hulse, Obama Assails Republicans on Campaign Finance, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/27/us/politics/27obama.html.
361. See, e.g., Reynolds and Denning, supra note 27, at 818–23; see also Lydia Saad,
Americans Issue Split Decision on Healthcare Ruling, GALLUP (June 29, 2012),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/155447/Americans-Issue-Split-Decision-Healthcare-Ruling.aspx (noting
that “[n]early two-thirds of Americans see politics as having a heavy hand in the ruling”).
362. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
363. Id.
364. See Saad, supra note 361.
365. See Eastman, supra note 22, at 21; Reynolds & Denning, supra note 27, at 818–23;
Magarian, supra note 26, at 35 (emphasizing that the leak of Roberts’s switch came from inside
the Court and that “[n]o capable defender of the Court’s institutional reputation would foster
such mayhem”).
366. See, e.g., Magarian, supra note 26, at 31–35. Professor Magarian criticized the Chief
Justice for “failing to provide sufficient legal justifications for any of his [three] major
conclusions while violating traditional norms of judicial review.” Id. at 16. First, Roberts’s
discussion of the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses was unnecessary and hence an
advisory opinion. Id. at 17–22. Second, he did not coherently explain his rulings that (1)
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achieve political and institutional aims hardly seems like the kind of
judicial modesty that will burnish the Court’s reputation as a
nonpartisan body governed by law.367
Finally, some observers have portrayed Roberts as a legal/political
genius in the mold of Chief Justice John Marshall.368 Most pertinently,
in Marbury v. Madison,369 Marshall achieved his essential long-range
goal of proclaiming the judiciary’s power to invalidate unconstitutional
acts by political officials, yet avoided a direct clash with the hostile
Jefferson Administration by declining to exercise jurisdiction and thus
not ordering Secretary of State Madison to do anything.370 In like
fashion, Chief Justice Roberts supposedly handed liberal Democrats an
immediate victory in National Federation, but advanced Republican
interests in the long run by (1) restricting Congress’s powers under the
Commerce, Necessary and Proper, and Spending Clauses,371 and
(2) shielding himself from accusations of partisanship if he later reaches
conservative results in cases addressing topics like affirmative action
and same-sex marriage.372 The analogy to Marshall, however, collapses
under closer inspection.
To begin with, Marshall and his fellow Federalist Justices faced
impeachment if they defied the Jefferson Administration,373 whereas
Chief Justice Roberts and his Republican colleagues were hardly in
such dire straits. On the contrary, there was no political imperative to
sustain the ACA.374 In fact, polls have consistently shown that most
Americans oppose Obamacare because they think it will decrease the
Congress in the ACA implicitly waived the AIA’s prohibition against premature challenges to
tax laws, or (2) the IM was a “tax” rather than a “penalty” for constitutional purposes. Id. at 22–
26. Third, his Spending Clause analysis hinged on the conclusory assertions that Congress had
“coerced” the states and had enacted a Anew@ Medicaid program. Id. at 34–35.
367. See id. at 33 (contending that legally principled Justices should ignore political
considerations—both actual partisanship and the possibility that they will be perceived as
partisan—because it is impossible to determine when it is appropriate to vote against one=s legal
convictions to counteract public perceptions of the Court’s political divisions).
368. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 25; Steven M. Feldman, Chief Justice Roberts’s Marbury
Moment, 13 WYO. L. REV. 335 (2013); Jeffrey Rosen, John Roberts, ATLANTIC (Oct. 24, 2012,
10:41 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/11/john-roberts/309131/; R. Emmett
Tyrrell, Jr., Roberts’ Foxy Rule, WASH. TIMES (July 4, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2012/jul/4/roberts-foxy-rule/.
369. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
370. See id. at 154–80; see also Pushaw, supra note 353, at 444–50 (describing Marshall’s
political and legal maneuvering in Marbury).
371. See, e.g., Tyrrell, supra note 368; see also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
372. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
373. See James M. O’Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REV. 219, 260 n.141 (1992).
374. See Reynolds & Denning, supra note 27, at 809–11 (rejecting the Marbury analogy on
the grounds that (1) President Obama almost certainly would have obeyed a Court judgment
invalidating the ACA, and (2) the public would have accepted such a ruling as legitimate and
indeed welcome, given Obamacare’s unpopularity).
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quality of health care and greatly increase costs.375
Moreover, unlike Marshall, Chief Justice Roberts is highly unlikely
to see his short-term sacrifice yield his desired long-lasting gains.
Initially, it is curious that Roberts would “keep his powder dry” for
more important future cases, because National Federation will likely
prove to be the most consequential decision of his tenure, given its
extensive analysis of constitutional power in the context of the most
sweeping and costly federal legislation since the 1960s. Put differently,
it makes little strategic sense for the Court to announce limits under
certain Article I clauses to be applied in later litigation (perhaps
involving trivial statutes akin to the Gun-Free School Zones Act), while
refusing to halt Congress’s constitutional overreaching in a landmark
case before it.376 Furthermore, Roberts’s approach unwisely assumes
that the liberal Justices will respect the National Federation precedent.
If a Democratic Justice replaces a Republican one, however, the bare
majority’s holdings under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper
Clauses will likely be swept away,377 and the Spending Clause ruling
will probably be confined to the peculiar factual situation of a total
funding cutoff.378 Finally, the Chief Justice would be naive to hope that
the liberal politicians and commentators who are now lauding him will
pull their punches later if he joins conservative decisions on hot-button
constitutional issues like same-sex marriage.
The comparison between Chief Justices Roberts and Marshall breaks
down further when one recognizes that Marshall led a unanimous Court
in Marbury and other key cases,379 whereas Roberts wrote a legally
375. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Divided on Repeal of 2010 Healthcare Law,
GALLUP (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/152969/Americans-Divided-Repeal-2010Healthcare-Law.aspx (documenting this position and adding that 72% of Americans believe that
the IM is unconstitutional); Frank Newport, Americans See More Economic Harm Than Good in
Health Law, GALLUP (July 5, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/155513/Americans-EconomicHarm-Good-Health-Law.aspx.
Furthermore, the severe economic downturn makes adding such an expensive entitlement
very risky, as evidenced by the recent fiscal implosion of many European nations under the
weight of unsustainable social welfare schemes (including government-controlled medical care).
See Max Boot, ObamaCare and American Power, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 25, 2010, 12:01 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703312504575141744210163602.html.
376. See Shapiro, supra note 229, at 22–23 (arguing that it made no sense for Roberts to
“save the Court” as a legal institution entrusted with making hard constitutional decisions by
rendering an opinion widely viewed as political in an epochal case).
377. See supra notes 34, 123–24 and accompanying text.
378. See supra text accompanying notes 294–97; see also Yoo, supra note 342 (contending
that a liberal Court majority would discard the National Federation limits under the Commerce
and Spending Clauses, in which case Roberts will not reap the long-term gains that Marshall
did in Marbury by permanently establishing judicial review).
379. See CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE
OF LAW 10, 16 (1996).
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unpersuasive opinion that no other Justice joined in full—telling
evidence of his inability to lead the Court.380 And his fellow
Republicans’ barely concealed anger381 suggests that they will be less
inclined to cut him slack in the future.
Finally, John Marshall was a skilled politician who had served in
Congress and as Secretary of State,382 while John Roberts had no
similar high-profile political experience but rather made his name as a
top-notch appellate lawyer.383 And therein might lie the true explanation
for Roberts’s switch. Appellate advocates appearing before the Supreme
Court strive to piece together at least five votes, usually by crafting a
middle-of-the-road position that features hyper-technical legal analysis
of sources that are often inconsistent or conflicting (as in most
constitutional areas).384 Such attorneys focus solely on winning the case,
even if doing so requires making questionable or hairsplitting
arguments—or perhaps convincing oneself that they are actually
sound.385 Thus, Roberts may have come to believe that (1) the
Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate “activity” but not
“inactivity;” (2) the IM “penalty” was not a “tax” under the AIA, but
somehow became one for constitutional purposes; and (3) under the
Spending Clause, it was possible to distinguish “coercion” from
“inducement” and “existing” Medicaid from the “new” ACA
program.386 It hardly impugns John Roberts’s integrity to suggest that,
in National Federation, he was acting as a skilled appellate litigator.
After all, that’s what he is.
And Roberts is not unique. For the first time in history, the Court has
no Justices with electoral experience, but rather consists of lawyers who
served as federal appellate judges (except for Elena Kagan, but even she
handled appeals as Solicitor General).387 Not surprisingly, their opinions
tend to treat the Constitution as a purely legal document and downplay
its status as a political charter.388 Relatedly, the Justices often get
bogged down in arcane disputes over the meaning of language in prior
380. See Magarian, supra note 26, at 34–35 (maintaining that the Chief Justice’s failure to
convince any of his colleagues to join his opinion (or to reinforce it in their separate opinions)
reflects poorly on his legal reasoning and leadership abilities).
381. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
382. See HOBSON, supra note 379, at 1–8.
383. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
385. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
386. See supra Subsections I.A.2., B.2.a., C.2. Consequently, the Chief Justice’s vote
switch on the taxing issue could have reflected a genuine change of heart and mind.
387. See Karlan, supra note 23, at 67.
388. See id. at 66–71 (making this point, and adding that the Justices’ lack of electoral
experience and their abuse by Senators at confirmation hearings often lead them to show disdain
for the political process and the constitutional judgments of elected officials).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

57

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 6 [2013], Art. 8

2050

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

cases that prevent them from reaching agreement on broader
constitutional principles.389
Ironically, then, the Court is composed exclusively of technically
proficient attorneys without relevant political experience at a time when
constitutional decision-making is widely regarded as politicized.
Several high-profile cases, particularly Bush v. Gore,390 have
increasingly led the public to see the Court not as an impartial arbiter of
justice under the law, but merely as another political institution.391 That
perception has been reinforced by the degeneration of the confirmation
process, which now focuses on the results a nominee is likely to reach
on politically charged subjects like abortion, not on her legal credentials
and judicial philosophy.392 In this partisan environment, Presidents have
correctly deduced that prominent politicians with well-known positions
on such issues have less chance of being confirmed than federal
appellate judges and lawyers, who can assure the Senate that they have
simply followed the law laid down by the Supreme Court.393
National Federation illustrates these problems. The Chief Justice
managed to cobble together five votes for each of his legal positions,
but only at the cost of writing a disjointed opinion that, taken as a
whole, was so unpersuasive and politically tone-deaf that none of his

389. The most pertinent example is the Justices’ bitter argument over the meaning of the
word “activity” as used in previous Commerce Clause cases. See supra notes 73–78, 82–91 and
accompanying text.
390. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam) (ruling that the Equal Protection Clause required
uniform standards in recounting ballots after a presidential election deadlock, and therefore
reversing a Florida court’s order allowing state election officials to apply a subjective “intent of
the voter” test, which effectively ensured George W. Bush’s election). This politically fraught
holding had little basis in the Constitution’s text, structure, and history, which indicated that
such electoral matters should be left initially to the states and ultimately to the United States
Congress. For a detailed explanation of this conclusion, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bush v. Gore:
Looking at Baker v. Carr in a Conservative Mirror, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 359, 360–61, 382–
402 (2001); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Presidential Election Dispute, the Political Question
Doctrine, and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Reply to Professors Krent and Shane, 29 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 603, 605, 611–23 (2001).
391. See Pushaw, supra note 34, at 520–29, 577–91 (highlighting the dangers of the
Court’s politicization of constitutional law).
392. See id. at 584–85, 588; Karlan, supra note 23, at 66 (lamenting the “highly partisan,
consciously ideological [confirmation] process”).
393. Most famously, at his confirmation hearing John Roberts depicted the Justices as
umpires who call “balls and strikes,” thereby implying that cases have clear-cut answers.
Roberts: ‘My Job Is to Call Balls and Strikes and Not to Pitch or Bat,’ CNN (Sept. 12, 2005,
4:58 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.statement/. Similarly, Elena
Kagan proclaimed that at the Supreme Court, “it’s law all the way down.” Paul Kane, Kagan
Sidesteps Empathy Question, Says ‘It’s Law All the Way Down,’ WASH. POST (June 29, 2010
4:48
PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/29/AR20100
62903935.html.
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colleagues joined him in full.394 Moreover, his sub rosa political
calculations look short-sighted and naive, and they have tarnished his
reputation.395 Unfortunately, Roberts was in a no-win situation, as he
would also have been criticized for political manipulation if he had
come out the other way.
In short, most Americans believe, with justification, that politics
heavily influences constitutional law. Given that reality, the Court’s
leader should be a seasoned politician who is adept at forging consensus
to achieve core goals—like, say, John Marshall or Earl Warren. Widely
acknowledged as our two most influential Chief Justices, they
understood the uniqueness of their legal/political perch atop the Third
Branch of Government.396 Marshall and Warren each had a broad and
unified constitutional vision, which they advanced in every one of their
opinions.397 Most critically, they exhibited the personal and political
leadership necessary to convince their colleagues to join them, as shown
by their unanimous opinions in watershed cases such as McCulloch v.
Maryland398 and Brown v. Board of Education.399
By contrast, John Roberts has been a shrewd legal technician who
carefully patches together compromise constitutional opinions with no
overarching theme. Perhaps that is the best we can hope for in our
polarized political landscape, but it is not the stuff of greatness in a
Chief Justice. Indeed, like his predecessor William Rehnquist, Chief
Justice Roberts has been unable to unify the Court as an institution.
On the contrary, it tends to fracture badly in all constitutional cases,
not merely those involving congressional power like National
Federation, Lopez, and Morrison. For example, the Justices split along
the usual political lines (except for Kennedy) in determining the extent
of the President’s Article II power to wage the War on Terrorism and
the countervailing constitutional rights of alleged enemy combatants.400
394. See supra notes 7–12, 22, 29–32, 340, 352, 366, 380 and accompanying text.
395. See supra notes 27, 358–61, 364–67, 376–78 and accompanying text.
396. See generally HOBSON, supra note 379, at 8–25, 181–214 (describing Marshall’s
illustrious judicial career); POWE, supra note 33, at 21–462 (detailing Warren’s transformation
of constitutional law).
397. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
398. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
399. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
400. For instance, five Justices held that the Constitution’s privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus extended to foreign “enemy combatants” who had been captured overseas and were
being detained outside of the United States’s territorial jurisdiction (in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba).
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito argued that this decision was unprecedented. Id. at 834, 838 n.4, 842, 850.
Indeed, the Court’s ruling contradicted several hundred years of Anglo-American law, and thus
can most plausibly be explained as the majority Justices’ policy dispute with an unpopular
President, George W. Bush. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Creating Legal Rights for Suspected
Terrorists: Is the Court Being Courageous or Politically Pragmatic?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
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Likewise, the liberal Justices consistently oppose the conservatives’
attempts to limit the federal judiciary’s Article III jurisdiction,
particularly in standing cases.401 Individual rights decisions feature
similar political and ideological fragmentation. Perhaps the best
illustration is Stenberg v. Carhart,402 which generated eight separate
opinions about whether state bans on partial-birth abortion violated
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process liberty and privacy rights.403
Such cases create the impression that “the Court” is not expounding
“the law” of the Constitution, but rather that nine Justices are expressing
their personal opinions and reading them into the Constitution.404 Such
individualistic decisionmaking is perhaps the inevitable result of the
unwillingness or inability of the Justices (even the professed
“originalists”) to seriously engage the Constitution’s text, structure,
underlying political theory, drafting and ratification history, and early
implementing practice and precedent.405 Instead, the Justices exercise
discretion to create doctrines that have little basis in the actual
Constitution (and that typically feature vague standards) and then apply
them to the facts and circumstances of each case, influenced at least
subconsciously by political and ideological factors.406
The Court’s application of a discretionary and politicized common
law approach to constitutional law will continue to harm its institutional
reputation. The Court could begin to repair the damage by adopting an
apolitical methodology, such as Neo-Federalism, that yields legal rules
which are truly rooted in the Constitution—and that would probably
work better in practice than the doctrines the Court has fabricated.407 I
1975 (2009).
Boumediene arose only because Congress had overturned Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466
(2004), in which the Court creatively interpreted the federal habeas corpus statute as extending
to aliens imprisoned beyond America’s borders (in Guantanamo Bay)—a holding that mangled
that law’s text and precedent, as four dissenting Justices demonstrated. See Robert J. Pushaw,
Jr., The “Enemy Combatant” Cases in Historical Context: The Inevitability of Pragmatic
Judicial Review, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1005, 1048–58 (2007) (citing the relevant statutes and
judicial opinions). Similarly, in 2006, Congress swiftly reversed the same five Justices’
remarkably strained reading of another federal statute, which appeared to have repealed the
Court’s appellate jurisdiction over Guantanamo Bay detainees and to have authorized the
President to try them by military commissions, as not doing either of these things. See id. at
1058–78 (discussing the cases, congressional acts, and commentaries).
401. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Limiting Article III Standing to “Accidental” Plaintiffs:
Lessons from Environmental and Animal Law Cases, 45 GA. L. REV. 1, 3–17, 34–53 (2010)
(summarizing and analyzing modern standing decisions).
402. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
403. See Pushaw, supra note 34, at 551–60 (examining these opinions).
404. See id. at 520.
405. See id. at 520–21, 528–29, 577, 590–91.
406. See id. at 520–29, 577–91.
407. See id. at 529; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 26, 26 (2000) (arguing that the actual Constitution is invariably more insightful and
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recognize, of course, that human nature will make the Justices reluctant
to give up the vast discretion they have conferred upon themselves.
Nonetheless, if the Court continues its freewheeling politicized
approach to constitutional law, its members cannot very well complain
when elected officials, commentators, and citizens treat the Court like a
political rather than legal institution.
CONCLUSION
It is too early to tell what lasting effect National Federation will
have on the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence or institutional
reputation. What is clear, however, is that Chief Justice Roberts missed
a singular opportunity to issue a transformative opinion that would
actually (and not merely rhetorically) have limited Congress to its
enumerated powers and protected the states’ reserved powers. Instead,
the Chief Justice’s late switch produced a bizarre result in which the
Court finally imposed genuine restrictions on the Commerce, Necessary
and Proper, and Spending Clauses, but nullified that effort by allowing
Congress to get its way under the Taxing Power. Chief Justice Roberts’s
refusal to “cross the Rubicon” in National Federation may ultimately
signal that the traditional Federalism Principle is alive in theory, but
dead in practice.

sensible than the Court’s elaborate doctrine interpreting the document).
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